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Note
An American Vision of Federal Arts
Subsidies: Why and How the U.S.




Debate over arts policy in the United States today rightly focuses on the
legal background of market regulations, asking how our property rights
regimes, intellectual and otherwise, should adapt to the internet's
revolution in reproducibility and to the growing consolidation of
distribution channels and backlists. Issues of copyright, digital rights
management, and frequency access have obvious and fundamental
ramifications for the creation, availability, and quality of a broad range of
artistic endeavors. Adjustments to these policies are the most important
form of "intervention" undertaken by the federal government because only
it can legitimately craft and enforce these necessary rules.
This Note focuses on financial interventions in the arts, which have also
been the subject of heated, if less productive, dispute. In the last few
decades, the American conversation about government subsidies to the
arts has been highly politicized, with many of the arguments wielded by
supporters contributing little beyond ideological posturing. Despite the
rhetorical force of appeals for money for the arts, virtually all of the major
justifications advanced by proponents fail to build a persuasive case for
direct federal funding. This Note argues that these proponents have largely
overlooked by far the strongest justification for direct arts subsidies, one
* J.D., Yale Law School 2009.
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that is uniquely American and uniquely persuasive: a civic argument for
government funding.
Developing this argument will occupy the final Part of this Note, but a
brief sketch is in order here. In a pluralist, democratic society, citizens
have an obligation to consider the background and position of a diverse
range of interlocutors. The arts are a crucial means of cultural expression
and communication; as such, they play a vital role in bringing citizens to a
deeper understanding of one another. On the strength of this civic benefit,
and because this important civic role, as shall be explained, is a kind of
externality not accounted for in arts markets, the government is justified in
intervening through direct subsidies. Explicitly identifying and embracing
this purpose will allow legislators and administrators to craft a legitimate,
effective, and inspiring subsidy policy. This in turn will have important
consequences for the legal background of arts markets, which is the focus
of so much attention today.
Part I of this Note sketches the structure of financial support, both
public and private, available to the arts in the United States and in the
West more generally. Part II discusses the origins, operation, and
historical development of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA),
emphasizing its guiding ideology of elitism prior to the nearly-fatal
scandals of the 1990s. Part III explains the conventional justifications for
government intervention in arts markets and examines some of the
weaknesses that severely limit their power to persuade. Part IV develops
an under-acknowledged civic argument for direct subsidy and advocates a
new American arts policy derived from it; it also points to ways the
democratic justification for government financial intervention might
influence the contemporary debate over the legal background to arts
markets.
It will be useful, as a preliminary matter, to clarify several distinctions.
First, funding for the arts can be considered in three broad categories.
Direct governmental subsidy, or grants of money or materials from a
public entity, may be paid directly to artists or institutions, may be paid
indirectly through a public or private intermediary (often an arm of a more
local government) that allocates the funds to particular artists or
institutions, or may involve the direct provision of art through the
establishment of a public museum or poet laureateship funded by the state
(which in turn, of course, supports the artists whose work is shown or who
fill the office). Direct subsidy may be provided by any level of
government, although this Note is concerned primarily with federal
subsidies. A second source of funding is donations of money or materials
by private individuals to artists or arts institutions; these gifts are
encouraged by the government through the indirect subsidy of tax
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Although this Note primarily considers the arts as a whole, it should be
noted that earned income takes different forms for different arts: the
market for (and costs associated with) a live performance of a new avant-
garde dance piece, a new pop music CD, and a famous Impressionist
painting look very different. To abstract a bit, the factors that distinguish
types of art include performance vs. object; live vs. recorded; unique vs.
reproduced; new vs. used or pre-existing; and "high" vs. "popular." Thus,
the eamed income of a theater company specializing in live performance,
will consist primarily of ticket sales, whereas a musician can draw on both
performances of her own and others' music as well as recordings of such
performances. Of course, the market for art is a vast structure that provides
income to a host of participants beyond the artists themselves; however,
when this Note refers to the art market, it generally means that portion of
the market that supplies earned income, rather than the entire chain of
transactions treating art as a market good. (The professionals who write
grant applications to state arts councils or court wealthy donors may
protest that they "earn" their income, too, but this Note will refer to the
fruits of their labor as direct subsidy and private donation supported by
indirect subsidy, respectively.)
As a final note on terminology, the distinction between "high" and
"popular" art is the murkiest and most controversial, in part because it
conflates judgments about merit with the objective question of the size of
the market for a given art form. The discussion that follows will largely
take for granted the most familiar categorizations-opera is "high," rap
music is "popular"-even while questioning its relevance to government
funding. A fine parsing of the distinction or a deeper reflection on whether
it is meaningful is outside the scope of this Note.
I. PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A GRANT RECIPIENT: SUPPORT FOR THE
ARTS IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY
Given the prominence of late-twentieth-century political controversies
over the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), it might surprise many
Americans to learn that the organization's budget for fiscal year 2006 was
less than $125 million (0.046% of the total federal expenditure) and that
the budget at its peak in 1992 was just over $175 million (0.01% of the
total).1 This amounted to only 680 per American in 1992 and 420 in 2006.
In its first 40 years, ending in 2005, the agency awarded less than $4
billion in grants.2
1. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS
APPROPRIATIONS HISTORY, http://www.nea.gov/about/Budget/AppropriationsHistory.html.
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In fact, although "the NEA" and "direct arts subsidies" are often used
interchangeably by commentators on both sides of the debate over the
value of government intervention in the art market, the NEA budget is a
very modest slice of total direct arts subsidy. Given the ambiguity
concerning what sorts of project should be counted as "art," it is difficult
to estimate how much the federal government spends in this area.
Adopting a moderately broad view of "art" that encompasses libraries and
museums of all sorts, a number of federal agencies regularly pay more for
art than the NEA, including the Smithsonian (whose relevant 2006
expenditures have been estimated at $517 million), the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting ($460 million), the Institute for Museum and Library
Services ($247 million), the Department of Defense (which spends in the
vicinity of $200 million on military bands), and the National Endowment
for the Humanities ($142 million).3 Numerous smaller programs diversify
the portfolio. For example, the General Services Administration's "Art-in-
Architecture" program sets aside at least one half of 1 percent of the
construction budgets for new federal buildings and major renovations for
public art (amounting to about $7 million in 2006), and the Department of
the Interior hosts artists-in-residence through the National Parks Service.
Even using conservative definitions of cultural activity, the NEA's budget
makes up less than 10% of direct federal arts funding.5
Total federal arts spending is itself a relatively small source of arts
funding: it accounts for only 9% of financing for nonprofit arts
organizations in the United States, with state and local funding making up
an additional 4%. (Private donations account for 43% of all such
financing, and earned income makes up the remaining 44%.6) Federal
funding of the arts is proportionally much higher in other Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development countries. A 1998 study by the
Arts Council of England estimated that the United States government
spent $6 per person on the arts in 1995; in similar years, Australia and the
United Kingdom each spent approximately $25, Canada and the
Netherlands $46, and Germany and Finland more than $85 per person.7 In
these countries, government funds constitute upward of 80% of the
budgets of many major arts institutions; in some cases, governments
3. TYLER COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY 87 (2006); NEA OFFICE OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, How
THE U.S. FUNDS ART (second edition), at 10 (2007).
4. Ronald Lee Fleming & Melissa Tapper Goldman, Public Art for the Public, PUB. INT., Spring
2005, at 55, 59; How THE U.S. FUNDS ART, supra note 3, at 13-14.
5. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 91.
6. HOW THE U.S. FUNDS ART, supra note 3, at 1. The constituencies of federal and state or local
funding are not identical: the latter tend to support smaller institutions and less-established artists.
COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 89.
7. NEA RESEARCH DIVISION, NOTE #74: INTERNATIONAL DATA ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON
THE ARTS, at 9 tbl. 1 (2000). Because of the difficulty of determining which government expenditures
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pledge to make up any operating deficits incurred by state-sponsored
festivals or organizations. 8
Thus, direct government spending on the arts in the United States is
quite low by any measure, whether compared to total government
expenditure, total arts financing, or the amounts spent on the arts by other
developed countries. However, these numbers dramatically understate the
extent of the U.S. government's financial involvement in the arts, which
largely takes the form of indirect subsidy through tax exemption.9 In 2003,
according to the American Association of Fundraising Counsel,
Americans donations in the category of "Arts, Culture, and the
Humanities" exceeded $29 billion, or $100 per American.1° Today,
donations by individuals, foundations, and corporations account for about
43% of the funding of nonprofit arts organizations-roughly the same
amount derived from earned income. If the donated time of volunteers
were taken into account, the ratio would shift even further toward private
giving." The federal government encourages this private largesse-which
is certainly much greater than in the other countries cited above 12-by
granting tax exemptions to donors to nonprofit organizations, including
arts groups, and by granting the organizations themselves income tax
exemption.
It is not clear how the United States stands in comparison to other
countries when this indirect funding is taken into account. One problem is
the paucity of foreign data on indirect subsidy. Another is the difficulty of
determining how much indirect subsidy costs the government; economists'
estimates range from $1.64 billion a year to $26 billion to $41 billion a
year in foregone tax revenue.13 We may also question whether all foregone
income should actually be counted as arts support, given the uncertainty of
the effect of this fiscal restraint on private giving. U.S. tax policy
undoubtedly generates greater private arts support, but given the long
history of patronage before the arrival of the income tax and the wide
range of motives for donation, only some of which are financial, there is
every reason to think that much of the money from individuals and
foundations would be flowing into the coffers of arts organizations even in
the absence of indirect subsidies.14 Despite the difficulty of determining
8. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 32
9. In fact, the United States became the first country to offer tax exemption for arts donations in
1917-1918. Toby Miller, The National Endowment for the Arts in the 1990s, 43 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1429, 1430 (2000).
10. Cited in COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 33.
11. Id.
12. Id..
13. The first of these estimates, from Arthur C. Brooks, In Search of True Public Arts Support,
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2004, at 88, 93, concedes a downward bias in the methodology. The
second is from COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 34.
14. This may be less true for corporations, although public relations campaigns like Phillip
Morris's suggest that even entities primarily concerned with maximizing profit might support the arts
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whether the American private-giving model results in more or less
government support for the arts than the European public model, it is
telling that one 1985 study suggested that the United States remains at the
bottom of the rankings even when indirect subsidies are counted.15
Even relatively large indirect subsidies, then, seem to play a relatively
small role in both the overall government budget and in the total funding
to arts organizations-and, of course, direct government spending plays an
even smaller role. The NEA's budget, a small fraction of that small
fraction, therefore seems insignificant in financial terms. However, the
Endowment has unique influence as the public face of government arts
policy, which grants it economic significance far beyond its annual
budget. The NEA imprimatur can launch or boost the career of an artist or
troupe; it boasts that every dollar it grants generates more than seven
additional dollars in private gifts. 6 Of course, much of this money is
probably not so much "generated" as redirected from other potential
recipients, but the financial power of the NEA is clear.
More important for the purposes of this paper, the NEA's prominence
carries with it significant symbolic value. As the only general arts organ of
the federal government, it is the closest thing America has to a Ministry of
Culture. Indeed, it has been referred to as the government's "chosen
instrument for promoting the arts" and "the most visible 'bully pulpit' for
the arts."' 7 Because it is funded by taxes, taxpayers feel (or may be
provoked to feel) invested in the NEA's activities in a way that they are
not invested in the gifts of private foundations, even large ones like the
MacArthur Foundation or prestigious ones like the Pulitzer Committee.
Indeed, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the name of the NEA had
itself become a provocation. The highest pitch of outrage over the arts and
the deepest passion on their behalf have been summoned in the last two
decades not by the bestowal of great honors by the cultural elite or the
critical response to a controversial work, but rather by the expenditure of
federal funds on art like Chris Ofili's The Holy Virgin Mary, a portrait-
collage incorporating elephant dung that might be described as brilliant
and penetrating or sacrilegious and depraved.
Sensations like the scandal over The Holy Virgin Mary suggest how
important the NEA is to any consideration of national arts policy, but they
have also induced an important change in the way the NEA manages its
financial interventions in the art world. As Part IV will explain, this
nascent shift helps illuminate the role arts subsidies should play in a
democracy as diverse as ours-and, ultimately, it is the NEA that must
in the absence of indirect subsidy.
15. INTERNATIONAL DATA ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON THE ARTS, supra note 7, at 5.
16. HOW THFE U.S. FUNDS ART, supra note 3, at 3.
17. DICK NETZER, THE SUBSIDIZED MUSE 74 (1978); Laura H. Chapman, A Century of
Distancing Art from the Public, ARTS EDUC. POL'Y REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 27, 28.
[21:2
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lead the implementation of the civic argument for arts subsidies.
II. ART AS THE OPIUM OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA: THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE NEA
This Part examines the history of the NEA and its entanglement with the
Western European fine arts establishment, as well as the funding crisis of
the 1990s that nearly destroyed the Endowment. As we shall see, the NEA
initially played a conciliatory role as a gesture of goodwill by Presidents to
the cultural elite; as the political scene began to change in the 1980s and
1990s, the role of the agency was called sharply into question, leaving it in
need of a new mission.
A. The Slow Development of Direct Art Subsidies in the United States
The United States was still young when it established the U.S. Marine
Band (1790), created its first national library (1800), and commissioned its
first paintings (1817: the four Revolutionary War scenes by John Trumbull
that still hang in the Capitol Rotunda). It would take nearly two centuries
for the country to set up a permanent, general organization to promote the
arts. Although Presidents, Senators, and Congressmen proposed the
establishment of such a body nearly a dozen times before 1963, and
despite the success of narrower projects focused on Washington, these
earlier efforts were defeated by a widespread perception of the arts as
elitist.' 8 A tradition of limited government reinforced by the Jacksonian
revolution of the 1820s, and the historical absence in this country of an
arts-friendly aristocracy connected to the government meant that cultural
institutions had grown accustomed to looking almost exclusively to
wealthy private donors for financial support beyond their earned income.' 9
The first large-scale arts schemes undertaken by the federal government
were the cultural divisions of the Works Progress Administration (WPA)
and a parallel program run by the Treasury Section beginning in 1935 as
part of a more general program of economic relief. The two programs
were organized quite differently, with the WPA distributing its money
widely and without a great deal of institutional formality while the
Treasury Section disbursed funds through expert panels. The former
model proved more successful, supporting large numbers of artists who
are widely acknowledged today as exceptionally talented. At their peak,
the WPA's Federal Art, Music, Theater, and Writers Projects provided
work for more than 45,000 artists, including such luminaries as Jackson
18. These earlier attempts are listed in Office of Communication, National Endowment for the
Arts, "A Brief Chronicle of Federal Support for the Arts," revised edition, at 6-8 (2000). See also
NETZER, supra note 17, at 53.
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Pollock and Edward Hopper, Aaron Copland and Virgil Thomson, Arthur
Miller and Orson Welles, and John Steinbeck and Zora Neale Hurston.
Together, the WPA and Treasury programs spent about $160 million ($2
billion in 2005 dollars), but despite the massive scale, they ended abruptly
when normal economic activity resumed at the end of World War I1.20
Any momentum for a national arts organization that the WPA might
have generated died with it. The arts programs had come under attack
from two corners. First, some artists and observers feared that treating an
out-of-work artist like an out-of-work farmhand was at odds with the
highest standards of artistic creation; this skepticism of work for hire
became much easier to maintain when the Depression had ended and other
means of support were more widely available. Second, many political
conservatives were provoked by the emphasis the programs gave to artists
from urban areas, where the program administrators assumed their budgets
would generate better art; these critics felt that the WPA had neglected
non-urban constituencies and tastes.21 As the Cold War got underway,
both of these concerns seemed only to intensify. Abstraction and
surrealism swept the New York art world, delighting the avant garde but
inviting denunciation from political leaders. President Truman himself
was heard to remark, "So-called modern art is merely the vaporings of
half-baked lazy people. 22 Artists, for their part, grew increasingly wary of
state involvement in the arts as they watched the spread of state-enforced
Social Realism and the widespread suppression of dissident artists of the
Iron Curtain. Painter John Sloan commented, "Sure, it would be fine to
have a Ministry of the Fine Arts in this country. Then we'd know where
the enemy is."
23
However, by the 1960s, both artists and politicians had undergone a
change of heart. The Cold War that alarmed the artists helped win over the
politicians, who quickly realized that the arts were a powerful propaganda
device for demonstrating American ingenuity and freedom. Cultural
diplomacy efforts by the State Department, the CIA, and the White House,
including President Eisenhower's $16.2 million Program for Cultural
Presentations Abroad, gradually culminated in the sense that a firm
commitment to the arts was necessary to wage the cultural Cold War.
2 4
Meanwhile, President Kennedy, whose inauguration prominently featured
Robert Frost and 57 other artists, wooed a cultural establishment that
20. NETZER, supra note 17, at 54-56; COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 68-73; BILL
KAUFFMAN, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS 137: SUBSIDIES TO THE ARTS (1990), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa137.html.
21. NETZER, supra note 17, at 54-55.
22. Quoted in ALAN HOWARD LEVY, GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS 94 (1997).
23. Quoted in KAUFFMAN, supra note 20.
24. LEVY, supra note 22, at 94-106; NETZER, supra note 17, at 57.
[21:2
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proved more pliable than individual painters like Sloane.2 1
Kennedy had proposed a federal arts advisory agency during his
candidacy,26 and in March of 1962, he appointed August Heckscher,
director of the Twentieth Century Fund, to prepare a study on government
and the arts. When it was submitted in May of 1963, Hecksher's report
called for the establishment of an Advisory Council on the Arts and a
National Arts Foundation to administer grants.27 Kennedy's assassination
left the work of lobbying for the new Foundation to Lyndon Johnson,
whose initial reluctance gave way to enthusiasm for the prospect of
appeasing his party's liberal intelligentsia.28 The legislative battle was won
through an alliance between arts organizations and the higher education
lobby, which strongly supported the establishment of what would become
the National Endowment for the Humanities, the NEA's sister
organization. 29 Kennedy's tragic death and his association with the
cause-Johnson had just renamed the nascent National Cultural Center the
Kennedy Center-also worked subtly in Johnson's favor. On September
29, 1965, he signed into law Public Law No. 89-206, the National
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act.3"
B. The Cautious Structure and Elitist Operation of the NEA
The structure of the new organization, which remains essentially intact
today, was designed in part to assuage the fears of artists who worried that
government involvement would politicize the arts.3 The agency is headed
by a Chair appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, but to insulate the Endowment's funding decisions from political
pressure, the Chair's four-year term was staggered against the President's.
Congress also inserted two additional layers of review further down the
chain: the National Council on the Arts and peer review panels. The
National Council on the Arts (NCA) originally comprised 26 private
citizens widely recognized for their cultural expertise who were appointed
25. Milton C. Cummings, Jr., To Change a Nation's Cultural Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
ARTS 141, 144 (Kevin V. Mulcahy & C. Richard Swaim eds., 1982). Even Camelot couldn't charm
everyone, though: the American Symphony Orchestra League was so skeptical of federal aid that it
declined to partake of NEA funds until the Nixon administration. JOSEPH WESLEY ZEIGLER, ARTS IN
CRISIS 14-15 (1994).
26. Cummings, supra note 25, at 143.
27. A BRIEF CHRONICLE OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 18, at 8-9.
28. KAUFFMAN, supra note 20.
29. ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 16.
30. A BRIEF CHRONICLE OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 18, at 9-11. Although
Johnson's proposal enjoyed widespread support, many conservative politicians continued to resist
until the end: the Republic Policy Committee's official position in 1965 was that "the arts and
humanities are thriving today and will continue to thrive so long as the deadening hand of the federal
bureaucracy is kept from the palate [sic], the chisel and the pen." Quoted in NETZER, supra note 17, at
59.
31. See HOW THE U.S. FUNDS ART, supra note 3, at 3-4; Elizabeth E. DeGrazia, In Search of
Artistic Excellence, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 133, 137-40 (1994).
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by the President and approved by the Senate for six-year terms; in 1997,
Congress amended the statute to provide for only 14 full members and an
additional 6 members of Congress sitting ex officio for two-year terms.32
Beneath the NCA lies the first line of consideration for grant applications,
the peer review panels. Although the recommendations of these panels are
subject to approval by the NCA and ultimately the Chair, both have
historically deferred to the decisions of the peer reviewers.33 The
Endowment was further protected against politicization by restrictions
forbidding it to provide more than 50% of a project's costs, limiting the
possibility of pork-barrel art.
3 4
The three-tiered system thus shields the primary decision-makers from
political heat and corruption. 35 But the idea of multi-layered government
intervention in the arts also conjures up the bogeyman of the soulless
bureaucrat who, with no inappropriate political motive, nevertheless drains
the aesthetic appeal of anything he tags with his red tape. In an effort to
preserve artistic quality, Congress populated the peer review panels with
arts experts drawn from the disciplines in which they considered grants.
The difficulty of prescribing a method for defining artistic quality was
addressed by legislative hand-waving: the enabling statute refers to
"professional excellence," "professional standards," and "artistic and
humanistic excellence."
36
Thus calibrated to appeal to skeptical lawmakers and the arts
community it was meant to support, the NEA set out to fulfill its
objectives, namely, "to make the arts more widely available to millions of
Americans; to preserve our cultural heritage for past and future
generations; to strengthen cultural organizations; and to encourage the
creative development of talented individuals., 37 The goal of creating a
national arts policy is conspicuously absent from this list, and indeed,
politically savvy supporters of the NEA insisted from the beginning that
the agency was not intended for this purpose.38 The fear of a Soviet-style
Ministry of Culture loomed large, and it was not long before the federal
government explicitly renounced such ambitions. At the Monaco Round
32. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE ARTS: HISTORY AND
PURPOSE, http://www.nea.gov/about/NCA/About_NCA.html. The structural change, coming in the
wake of a number of scandals, was largely intended to ensure that NEA funds would not be spent in
ways that would offend taxpayers or provoke further controversy.
33. As the number of grant applications increased over the years, the support role of NEA staff
has grown; they sometimes pare down applicant pools for the panels.
34. Typically, NEA funding is a much smaller fraction of the total project budget, often around
10%. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 96.
35. C. Richard Swaim, The National Endowment for the Arts: 1965-1980, in PUBLIC POLICY AND
THE ARTS 169, 178 (Kevin V. Mulcahy and C. Richard Swaim eds., 1982).
36. DeGrazia, supra note 31, at 137.
37. NETZER, supra note 17, at 62.
38. John K. Urice, Three Contemporary Reports That Influenced the Creation of the National
Endowment for the Arts, J. ARTS MGMT., L., & SOC'Y, Spring 2005, at 5, 7.
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Table on Cultural Policies hosted by the United Nations in 1969, the
Americans opened their presentation by noting, "The United States has no
official cultural position, either public or private. 39
However, operative goals have a way of diverging from official ones.4 °
The expenditures by the NEA over its first two decades reveal a clear
pattern of support for elite artistic forms and established cultural
organizations. 41 Although the agency did fund non-elite art forms and
local programs through initiatives like state-centered Folk Arts
Apprenticeships and a $2 million City Spirit program, 42 on the whole it
evinced a clear bias for "high" culture. From 1978-1984, for example, one
analyst estimates that a total of only 18-30% of funds disbursed by the
NEA went to "mass-constituency" art forms like jazz, folk arts, and arts
education; new arts organizations; and programs to stimulate artistic
creation directly.43
The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (the Met) and the Art
Institute of Chicago (AIC) are illustrative beneficiaries of this bias.
Obviously, these organizations are established and, at least with regard to
the kinds of art they house, elite. They also earned spots on the Chronicle
of Philanthropy's 1992 "Philanthropy 400," a list of the nonprofit
organizations with the largest income from the private sector 44 -the Met's
annual income exceeds the NEA's.4" And yet, although most of the NEA's
grants are measured in the tens of thousands, yearly awards to the Met and
the AIC have often exceeded $100,000, so these rich, established
institutions receive a significant portion of both private and public
largesse.46 The confluence of private and public money is doubly
alarming: not only does it call into question the necessity of the direct
subsidies, but it also reinforces an existing tendency of individual donors
to favor classical, Western European arts and enrich established
organizations.47 Even the money the NEA passes along to state and local
agencies follows this trend: small-city museums often use grants to
purchase works from New York artists.48 In New York itself, arts
organizations report that despite the "phenomenal growth of community
39. Quoted in Miller, supra note 9, at 1430.
40. Swaim, supra note 35, at 182.
41. EDWARD ARIAN, THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 58 (1989); COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra
note 3, at 99.
42. A BRIEF CHRONICLE OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 18, at 23, 38.
43. ARIAN, supra note 41, at 41-44; 65-66.
44. NETZER, supra note 17, at 63-64
45. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 97.
46. It seems unlikely that the NEA grants are generating new private money for--or even
directing new private money to-these bastions of high culture, given their long history of private
support. Despite the much-vaunted "multiplier" effect of NEA grants on private giving, the income
streams are probably independent for this sort of institution.
47. ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 65.
48. KAUFFMAN, supra note 20 (citing EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE DEMOCRATIC MUSE 7 (1984)).
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and minority arts programs," funding for these non-elite groups "has come
exclusively from the state."49
Unsurprisingly, the primary beneficiaries of this favoritism were the
elite audiences who patronized traditional high culture events.50 Art
museums in the mid-1980s, for example, drew a clientele that was quite
disproportionately white, college educated, and professional.5 One
commentator described funding of the arts as "highbrow pork barrel," a
brazen wealth transfer from society to the elite.52
In part, this unspoken national arts policy resulted from the very
structure meant to ensure artistic independence. 53  The deliberate
informality of the panel procedures, the use of working artists and arts
administrators to evaluate applicants whom they may know well, and the
sheer volume of applications received all give a decided advantage to
established artists on good terms with members of the cultural elite.54 Staff
members or jurors sometimes facilitated deliberation by screening the
applicant pool before the panel even convened,55 and even so a group
charged with assessing the quality of orchestras might have heard only a
fraction of the applicants in the few years prior to judging.56 One early
panel reportedly ignored the grant applications and debated only how to
allocate awards among the artists they already knew.57 These problems
were largely hidden, thanks to the absence of any mechanism for
measuring the success or efficacy of grants. Because Congress refrained
on political grounds from requiring periodic reviews, informal reports on
grants awarded were the only internal instruments of accountability. 58
These structural issues have been exacerbated by the fact that agents of
the NEA tend, at every level, to share the agency's elite bias. NEA staff
members "often have background association and training in those areas
of art activity most closely associated with traditional white, Western
European culture and its milieu, creating an instinctive bias on their part
toward applications who are representative of that milieu."59 Appointees
49. ARIAN, supra note 41, at 55.
50. Arthur C. Brooks, Who Opposes Government Arts Funding?, 108 PUB. CHOICE 355 (2001).
51. KAUFFMAN, supra note 20 (citing WILLIAM D. GRAMPP, PRICING THE PRICELESS 57-58
(1989)).
52. Id. (citing Robert J. Samuelson, Highbrow Pork Barrel, NEWSWEEK, August 21, 1989, at 44).
53. ARIAN, supra note 41, at 32.
54. DeGrazia, supra note 31, at 141.
55. Philip Pearlstein, Censorship on Stylistic Grounds, ART J., Winter 1991, at 65, 70.
56. ARIAN, supra note 41, at 52.
57. MICHAEL BRENSON, VISIONARIES AND OUTCASTS 49-51 (2001).
58. Fleming, supra note 4, at 74. The NEA is planning to experiment with a qualitative review
system for a random sampling of grants. Whether such a program will offer meaningful accountability
remains to be seen. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2006-2011, at 10
(2006), available at http://www.nea.gov/about/Budget/StrategicPlanFY06-1 l.pdf
59. ARIAN, supra note 41, at 57. The "traditional, white Western European culture" referred to
here is, of course, "high" art, rather than "traditional" folk art or popular culture.
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(the actual peer reviewers, as opposed to the full-time professional staff)
have followed this rule, too, from the beginning. The review panel for the
first visual arts grants included the director of the Walker Art Center and
painter Robert Motherwell;6  higher up the chain of command, the first
members of the NCA included Marian Anderson, Leonard Bernstein,
Harper Lee, Gregory Peck, Sidney Poitier, and John Steinbeck.6' With the
cr~me de la crbme of high culture manning the ship, the elitist course may
have been inevitable.
C. A Political History of the NEA
The elitist course was also desirable, for the political establishment no
less than the cultural one. Indeed, earning the goodwill of the cultural elite
was the unspoken intention of the politicians who built the Endowment.
The assumption that the agency should support the elite was challenged
unsuccessfully by an investigative study in 1979. Among other concerns,
the report noted,
The problem in peer review faced by the Endowment is the selection
of a panel of experts in a field who can offer quality judgments
acceptable to the field because of recognized competence and yet
seek an ever-broadening geographical and social representation of the
various art disciplines that have traditionally been
compartmentalized, specialized, and representative of white western-
European culture.62
The study had been requested by Sidney Yates, the NEA's champion in
the House of Representatives, as a routine review, and its sharp criticism
surprised both the Congressman and the Endowment. When the NEA filed
a lengthy response that overlooked the accusation of discrimination,
Representative Yates eschewed the original report, saying "I found
nothing instructional or beneficial about the endowment's work
commented upon. It isn't what I intended."63
In truth, the elitism of the NEA was the natural outgrowth of the
political purpose for which it was devised. The agency has served
successive administrations as a pawn for political maneuvering; in the first
decades of its existence, it was deployed by Presidents on both sides of the
political spectrum to woo the liberal literati who reaped its benefits while
funding enough alternative projects to maintain a plausible claim of even-
handedness. Although there is every reason to believe that President
Kennedy's affection for the cultural establishment was genuine, he also, as
his friend Gore Vidal has pointed out, "knows the propaganda value of
60. ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 21.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Quoted in ARIAN, supra note 41, at 51.
63. Quoted in ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 42.
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artists and he has... tried to win them over." 64 Lyndon Johnson's
advocacy of the NEA was much more cynical: Arthur M. Schlesinger, a
champion of the Hecksher report, elicited the new president's support with
the calculated assurance that an organization like the NEA "can strengthen
the connections between the Administration and the intellectual and
artistic community-something not to be dismissed when victory or defeat
next fall will probably depend on who carries New York, Pennsylvania,
California, Illinois, and Michigan."65 Without this political motivation or
the need to appear an appropriately cultivated successor to Kennedy,66 it is
doubtful that the president who hosted a hootenanny as his first musical
evening in the White House would have lent much aid to the cause of
federal subsidies for "high" art.6
Richard Nixon, known for his support of the House Un-American
Activities Committee's investigations of artists in the 1950s, seemed even
less likely than Johnson to become a friend to the NEA. Once in office,
however, he fully supported his appointee Nancy Hanks as the
Endowment's second Chair;68 together, they presided over a skyrocketing
appropriation that had increased by a factor of nearly twelve by the end of
Hanks's second term. 69 Hanks was known for her savvy and powers of
persuasion, but Nixon had political reasons of his own for throwing his
weight behind the burgeoning Endowment. As his Special Counsel
Leonard Garment explained, "It was the classic strategy: 'Hit 'em where
they ain't.' Surprise the snobs: For God's sake-Richard Nixon has
become a patron of the arts!"7°
In keeping with Nixon's political strategy, it was under Hanks that the
agency's alliance with the cultural and intellectual elite was cemented.7
As noted above, some members of the cultural establishment, notably
museums, orchestras, and opera, were skeptical of government funding.
When Hanks assumed control in 1969, the NEA featured no formal
programs for these organizations; by 1973, they accounted for nearly half
of all program funds.72
The shift was prompted in part by the symphonies, museums, and
operas themselves, who had seen that involvement with the NEA did not
64. Quoted in KAUFFMAN, supra note 20.
65. Quoted in Cummings, supra note 25, at 160.
66. NETZER, supra note 17, at 62.
67. Kennedy, Johnson, and, later, Nixon, may also have been eager to defuse the possible future
candidacy of Nelson Rockefeller, the great patron of the arts who founded the New York State Council
on the Arts in 1960. See NETZER, supra note 17, at 62; Miller, supra note 9, at 1431.
68. Roger Stevens, Johnson's appointee, was the first.
69. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS APPROPRIATIONS HISTORY, supra note 1.
70. Quoted in ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 26.
71. Swaim, supra note 35, at 184.
72. ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 27. Hanks also increased funding to less obviously elite programs
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eviscerate aesthetic standards and who had encountered economic trouble
toward the end of the 1960s.73 On the other side of the process, politicians
were inclined to respond generously to these arts organizations' change of
heart. As one commentator noted at the time, "When the President [Nixon]
thinks of the arts, I have been told, he pictures museums and symphonies.
When congressmen think of the arts they think of cultural programs
involving large audiences."74 But the NEA's reorientation toward the heart
of high culture was not simply the product of a natural and unconscious
alliance between the political and cultural elite. Leonard Garment sent a
memo to Nixon informing him of the new receptivity of orchestras and
museums and advising him to take advantage of it as a political tactic:
For an amount of money which is minuscule in terms of the total
federal budget, you can demonstrate your commitment to 'reordering
national priorities to emphasize the quality of life in our society.' The
amount proposed... would have high impact among opinion
formers. It is, on the merits, justified, i.e. the budget for the arts and
humanities is now completely inadequate. Support for the arts is,
increasingly, good politics. By providing substantially increased
support for cultural activities, you will gain support from groups
which have hitherto not been favorable to this administration.... We
are talking about the vast majority of theatre board members,
symphony trustees, museum benefactors, and the like who,
nevertheless, feel very strongly that federal support for the arts and
humanities is of primary importance. It is well for us to remember
that these boards are made up, very largely, of business, corporate
and community interests.
75
It was thus that "[t]he haves of the arts constituencies saw the priorities
of the agency adjusted in line with their needs. 76
Politically speaking, there was one problem with supporting the cultural
establishment: it is located almost exclusively in major cities, which
makes it less appealing to representatives from rural states. Toward the
end of Hanks's second term, Dick Netzer, Dean of the Graduate School of
Public Administration at New York University, observed, "In
congressional committee hearings on NEA authorizations and
appropriations, the endowment's area of greatest vulnerability is its
support of established artistic institutions and of activities concentrated in
New York., 7 7 This issue was to dominate NEA appropriations under her
successor, Livingstone Biddle, who presided over a battle between the old
73. NETZER, supra note 17, at 67
74. ARIAN, supra note 41, at 49 (quoting Barry Schwartz, Politics and Art: A Case of Cultural
Confusion, ARTS IN SOC'Y, Fall-Winter 1973, at 28).
75. Swaim, supra note 35, at 185-186.
76. Swaim, supra note 35, at 189.
77. NETZER, supra note 17, at 73.
Reid
15
Reid: An American Vision of Federal Arts Subsidies
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
"elitism" and a new "populism."'7 8
Biddle himself favored the latter and successfully adjusted funding so
that approximately half the agency's budget went toward "populist"
projects. However, it is important to understand what he and other leading
advocates meant by "populism." He envisioned not a rise to prominence of
folk art or other forms and media outside the bounds of high culture;
rather, he wanted to be sure that Americans outside major cities had access
to the fruits of "high" cultural traditions. He declared, "[W]e are dealing
with the arts across the whole length of the country, and that outreach,
availability to quality in the arts is what is most basic with our program,
access to quality in the arts."79 He thus divorced the organizational
component of the cultural establishment (e.g., the Mets and the Boston
Symphony Orchestras), which was firmly based in major cities, from the
expressive component (e.g., the works of "high" artists like Picasso,
Verdi, and Chopin), moving funds away from the former in order to
advance the latter more broadly. Biddle's "populism" was about access,
about spreading an elite idea of "artistic quality" to parts of the country
where the national cultural elites rarely found themselves. This is, at best,
half populism; given that the theaters, orchestras, and museums newly
funded by the NEA presented high culture for an audience of local elites,
it may hardly qualify as populism at all.8° As Princeton Sociologist Paul
DiMaggio noted, "Congress nearly always wants the same thing: an
agency that is both popular and populist without deserting the artistic
elite."81
The election of Ronald Reagan reflected the growing power of political
and moral conservatives and augured a new, more fundamental kind of
battle at the NEA. For the first time, the agency would be seen primarily
as a political liability and would have to struggle to maintain funding.
Initially, the mounting opposition to the agency was predominantly fiscal
and achieved only limited success. Reagan had originally planned to
replace the NEA entirely with a public corporation to raise private money
for the arts, following the model of the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting,82 but Democrats in Congress resisted his proposed halving
of the agency's budget.83 The appropriation fluctuated in subsequent years,
so that by 1989 it had risen only $10 million from its pre-Reagan peak of
$159 million. Frank Hodsoll, whom Reagan appointed Chair, continued to
direct the bulk of this money to the Western European arts
78. ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 38-39. Biddle served as Chair from 1977-1981. He was a Carter
appointee, President Ford having reappointed Nancy Hanks.
79. Quoted in Swaim, supra note 35, at 183.
80. ARIAN, supra note 41, at 42.
81. Id. at 50.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Miller, supra note 9, at 1432.
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The NEA's support of these organizations translated into support of the
avant-garde art these recipients favored." This consequence of elitism
proved nearly fatal when controversy erupted over two of the agency's
grants in 1989. The awards had made their way through institutional
intermediaries to a retrospective of Robert Mapplethorpe's work,
including homoerotic and sadomasochistic images, and an exhibition
including the art of Andres Serrano, whose photograph Piss Christ depicts
a crucifix submerged in the artist's urine. The religious right, fuelled by
the vocal denunciations of the American Family Association, turned their
objection to federal funding of this art into a national issue.86 Although the
NEA had suffered scandal before-most recently over a production of
Rigoletto in Virginia whose advertising stereotyped Italian-Americans, to
the displeasure of Congressman Mario Biaggi8 7-it now became a
battlefield in the struggle for control of national politics, and particularly
for the heart of the Republican Party.88 Moderate President George H.W.
Bush made a show of political strength-or miscalculation-by
submitting the usual reauthorization bill in 1990 as though nothing
untoward had happened; Senator Jesse Helms led the enraged
Congressional response, which asserted the power of the Republican's
conservative base by calling for the total elimination of the Endowment.89
For the first time since 1965, the nation seriously considered the
question of whether and how government support of the arts could be
justified. In the two months before the 1990 vote on the life of the NEA,
the Washington Post and Washington Times alone published more than
eighty articles and editorials on the subject.9" The arts community was
shaken by this unusually forceful opposition. Arts institutions and
individual artists proved unable to agree on why or even whether the
grants in question should be defended, much less on how to respond to the
political heat. 91 Although, as the next Part will explain, much of the arts
community would later rally behind economic impact studies, it proved
84. ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 60; see also ARIAN, supra note 41, at 61.
85. Thus, by supporting traditional institutions, the NEA has often supported nontraditional art.
See Pearlstein, supra note 55, at 68.
86. Gregory B. Lewis & Arthur C. Brooks, A Question of Morality, PUB. AMtN. REV., Jan.-Feb.
2005, at 8, 10; Gregory B. Lewis, Public Spending on the Arts as Morality Policy, 34 POL'Y STD. J.
131, 132 (2006). Although social conservatives have generated a great deal of publicity and political
capital by attacking the arts on moral grounds, surveys suggest that the link between religious values
and attitudes toward art and art funding have not changed significantly since the 1989 scandals. A
negative attitude toward government spending generally-that is, fiscal conservatism-remains the
strongest predictor of opposition to arts funding. Lewis, Public Spending, at 136.
87. ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 54-57.
88. See Editorial, Wretched Excess, NAT'L REV., February 23, 2004.
89. Chris Burgess, Multiple Streams and Policy Community Dynamics, J. ARTS MGMT., L., &
SOC'Y, Summer 2006, at 104, 106-07.
90. Id. at 113.
91. Id. at 117-18.
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unable to organize effectively under the pressure of this first major attack.
In the event, President Bush helped prevent any funding cuts (and save
face) by calling for the appointment of an independent commission to
study the NEA. Congress appeased conservative Republicans by
implementing a variety of structural changes to the agency, increasing the
amount of NEA funding that had to be passed on to the states (it is now
40%) and eventually eliminating direct grants to artists (even though the
Mapplethorpe and Serrano awards had been institutional, supporting the
museums that displayed the works in question).92 The crisis simmered,
with every year of the 1990s witnessing congressional calls for the
defunding of the NEA, until the Republican Revolution of 1994 allowed
the agency's opponents to cut its budget in half (to $99.5 million) for
1996. The agency survived by restructuring its budget to allocate roughly
three-fourth of its funds to relatively safe projects of heritage,
preservation, education, access, planning, and stabilization, leaving only a
quarter of its reduced budget for "creation and presentation. '93 Although it
enjoyed a minor revival recently under President George W. Bush and
Chair Dana Gioia, the Endowment's 2007 appropriation, $124.5 million,
was only about 70% of its 1992 peak.
94
With its standard-bearer the casualty of a political skirmish, the arts
community suddenly found itself on the defensive in the culture wars and
ill-prepared to agree on a battle plan-or even on which policies would be
most desirable. A sort of crisis of identity ensued, in which arts
organizations and individual artists were forced to justify themselves, to
confront the question of why their activities deserved federal funding.
95
This question is the subject of the next Part.
III. TAXING PETER TO PAY PICASSO?: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ARTS
SUBSIDIES
Economists, artists, and civilians who support arts subsidies have
devised an impressive variety of arguments on their behalf. The burden, if
the merit of the arts can no longer be assumed, is a heavy one: advocates
must show that the government is justified in interfering with the generally
laissez-faire system that characterizes American markets. This Part
considers the major justifications for arts subsidies available in the
literature, including arguments based on the inherent value of the arts,
arguments employing the tools of the economist, and instrumental
92. Lawrence D. Mankin, et al., The National Government and the Arts, J. ARTS MGMT., L., &
SOc'Y, Fall 2001, at 184, 187.
93. Molly Bendall, Ms. Smith Goes to Washington, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 11, 2000, at 36
(reviewing Jane Alexander, Command Performance (2000)).
94. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS APPROPRIATIONS HISTORY, supra note 1.
95. KEviN F. MCCARTHY, ET AL., GIFTS OF THE MUSE, at 1 (2004).
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arguments based on externalities.96 Ultimately, nearly-but not quite-all
of them are unpersuasive with regard to direct, federal, NEA-style
subsidies in the American context.
A. Arguments from Above the Market
1. Arts as Merit Goods
Lovers of the arts, especially the traditional "high" arts historically
favored by the NEA, often consider their worth to be self-evident.
Confirmed in their taste by centuries of expert testimony and aristocratic
cultivation, they may regard art as inherently civilizing, uplifting, and
ennobling. Since art is perceived as a good in both the positive and the
normative sense, funding it, from the public coffers or otherwise, is a
valuable end in itself. This idea enjoyed special prominence among the
entrepreneurs-turned-philanthropists who endowed museums, libraries,
and other arts institutions in the first part of the last century, but it persists
today in a less overtly paternalistic guise. British socialite and journalist
Barbara Amiel recently wrote in an account of Placido Domingo's
performance of Verdi's Stiffielo at the Royal Opera House of London,
"Giving funds to opera when you yourself don't like it is akin to giving to
a charity for an illness that you will never get."97 Amiel's statement, made
in a piece titled "In Defence of Elitism," suggests that opera, like
medicine, is inherently good.
On this view, the arts are too important to leave to the vagaries and
degradations of the private market. The argument, put forcefully, might
follow this course: given the present woeful level of public subsidy, even
the lofty Metropolitan Opera, which regularly receives hefty grants froin
the NEA, must depend on ticket sales for part of its revenue. In fact, the
Met budgets for 96% occupancy," which means that it may be forced to
pander to audiences, contaminating the value of pure art in order to fill the
house. Government subsidy could alleviate these financial constraints and
free artists to channel the muse more effectively.
This sketch of a naYve merit good argument is so broad as to be
reductive. This Part will shortly explore more sophisticated variations that
attempt to shore up some of its obvious flaws, but, because this instinctive
response seems to underlie the thinking of many arts supporters, it is
worth noting four equally broad objections to this kind of justification.
First, the merit good assertion, even if accepted, is useless as a guide to
96. The discussion will necessarily be somewhat broad and non-technical in order to address the
full range of these arguments.
97. Barbara Amiel, In Defence of Elitism, MACLEAN'S, July 31, 1995, at 9.
98. Werner W. Pommerehne & Bruno S. Frey, Public Promotion of the Arts: A Survey of Means,
14 J. CULT. ECON. 73, 75-76 (1990), reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECON. 674 (Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
Reid
19
Reid: An American Vision of Federal Arts Subsidies
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
public policy. The argument draws its rhetorical force from an invocation
of lofty ideas-the arts, the muse-that cannot survive the appropriations
process. How much money should the government devote to the arts?
How would the muse disburse the funds? Subsidy proponents have to
tackle these practical questions, too, and they need more nuanced
arguments to do so. 99
The second broad objection is based on another distinction muddied by
the naive merit good argument: is the desideratum the act of artistic
creation or the aesthetic experience of the work created? If the experience
of the audience is a significant part of the value of art, there might be
better ways of achieving the elements of that experience; we would have
to specify them to demonstrate otherwise.' 00 And, as long as we are
analyzing the value of aesthetic experience, we might note that it seems
frivolous compared to, say, the experience of having enough to eat. If the
federal budget is inadequate to eliminate poverty and hunger, how could
we justify diverting money to the arts? The merit good argument fails to
show why the arts are so good, which is useful for forging a big-tent
alliance but fatally evasive in a conversation with skeptics.
This suggests a third kind of objection: surely not everything called art
deserves federal funding. A naive merit good defense overlooks the
difficulty of deciding what art--or even what sorts of art-should be
subsidized. Without resolving this conundrum of quality and category, it is
virtually impossible to get any useful policy guidance out of the claim that
art per se should receive government largesse.
If the nafve merit good argument is advanced in the presence of an
economist, a fourth broad (but fundamental) objection is likely to surface
quickly. In its least sophisticated form, the merit good argument is
paternalistic in a way that violates one of the most basic assumptions of
neoclassical economics: consumer sovereignty. Capitalist societies regard
the individual as the best judge of his own welfare and conclude that, in
the absence of systemic market failure, illegal activity, or (perhaps)
congenital distributive inequality, the individual should be allowed to vote
freely with his dollars. The default position under this system is that the
level of arts funding will be determined by individual consumers, both
spectators and donors, in a competitive free market.' 0
Advocate of subsidies, who want the government to treat the market for
the arts as an exception to this general policy of noninterference, must
99. Shauna Saunders, The Case for the National Endowment for the Arts, 37 HIST. POLITICAL
ECON. 593, 602 (2005).
100. David Cwi, Merit Good or Market Failure, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE ARTS 59, 63 (Kevin
V. Mulcahy and C. Richard Swaim eds., 1982).
101. Alan Peacock, Economics, Cultural Values and Cultural Policies, in CULTURAL ECONOMICS
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advance an argument on grounds other than pure paternalism or elitism.
As Washington Post Book World critic Jonathan Yardley has asked, "Why
should the struggling young artist be entitled to government subsidy when
the struggling young mechanic or accountant is not?"10 2 This Part presents
several responses to Yardley's question and considers their merits in light
of the history of American federal arts subsidy. The rest of this Section
looks particularly at arguments based on access to and conservation of the
arts, both of which seem to rest on the idea that the arts are inherently
meritorious.
2. Equity, Access, and Taste
The first more nuanced merit good argument to be examined here points
to inequities in access to the arts. In March 1965, the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund published an influential report laying out arts policy
recommendations; August Hecksher, who had just advocated the creation
of the NEA to President Kennedy, was a member of the Rockefeller panel.
The report heralded the value of the arts and the need for subsidy,
emphasizing that "the arts are not for a privileged few but for the
many.... their place is not on the periphery of society but at its center....
they are not just a form of recreation but are of central importance to our
well being and happiness.""1 3 This line of reasoning supplements the merit
good assertion with an argument about equity or access. Not only are arts
in themselves worthy of greater levels of production and consumption; a
large potential audience would actually like to participate in the art market
but are prevented because they are too poor or they live in small
communities that cannot support an outpost of the arts industry. Given the
spiritually uplifting qualities of the arts, the government should work to
increase the availability of the arts, at least to these populations.
It is certainly true that participation in the traditional "high" arts is
correlated with income and education (and even with parental education
and income) 0 4 and with proximity to a major urban center. Some NEA
programs address this disparity, including the Expansion Arts grants for
emerging organizations, awards to preserve heritage and folk art, and
Carter-era bureaucratic initiatives like a 1978 task force to determine the
arts needs of the Hispanic community.105 However, we have seen that,
historically, the NEA has not treated increasing access in this way to be its
central mission, although access was Livingston Biddle's watchword; if
this argument holds up, it would also demand a shift in the way federal
102. KAUFFMAN, supra note 20 (citing Jonathan Yardley, The NEA Debate, Derailed by Drama,
WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1990, at C2).
103. Quoted in Saunders, supra note 99, at 604.
104. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, ARTS EDUCATION IN ACTION (1999).
105. A BRIEF CHRONICLE OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 18, at 28-29.
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subsidies are deployed.
To the extent that this argument avoids naked paternalism, it depends on
the empirical assertion that poor and rural populations would like to
consume more art but are prevented from doing so by high ticket prices or
problems of coordination. If the economic concerns are to rise to the level
of market failure, this untapped demand for traditional non-profit arts
would have to be fairly widespread in these populations. Some tangential
evidence suggests this isn't so. For instance, from 2001 to 2005, the
American GDP grew nearly 12% and recreational consumer spending rose
more than 31%, but admission to performing arts events increased by less
than 2%; most of the increase in leisure spending went to video and audio
goods, toys and sports supplies, and "commercial amusements."
10 6
Supporters might point to surveys suggesting a large willingness to pay for
arts to refute this evidence; the next Section discusses this sort of
argument. Certainly, these numbers are not conclusive, but they offer
some support to the idea that many people would not choose to spend
extra income on the arts typically supported by the NEA, which in turn
suggests that lack of access is not the main explanation for low ticket
sales. If this is so, this argument about access collapses back into a claim
that arts are inherently meritorious.
Even if poverty and distance suppress a large actual demand for the arts,
it is by no means clear that federal subsidy is the correct solution. Simple
inability to pay is not treated as a market failure by neoclassical
economics; the cure for inequity is not usually considered payment-in-
kind but redistribution through taxation (or through social and political
policies to redress systemic inequality). This seems especially appropriate
in the present context, given that the arts, no matter how valuable, are not
necessary to life, unlike some other goods that may also be out of reach
for the poor. Rural populations can make a stronger market-failure
argument on the basis of economies of scale in production and start-up
costs, but they have a weaker claim to untapped demand; true art lovers
would presumably choose to move to a place where the arts are already
available. (If lack of resources prevents this, the distance argument seems
to shift to a general distributive inequality argument.)
Even granting a large, unfulfilled demand in the lower income brackets
and assuming that government money should be used to address the
problem, NEA-style supply-side subsidy would seem to be an inefficient
means of doing so. Indeed, economists such as William Baumol 1°7 and
Edwin G. West'08 have advocated arts voucher systems as a way to
106. NEA OFFICE OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, NOTE 91: CONSUMER SPENDING ON PERFORMING
ARTS, at 7 (2006).
107. See Interview with William Baumol, The Case for Subsidizing the Arts, CHALLENGE, Sep.-
Oct. 1995, at 52, 56.
108. See EDWIN G. WEST, SUBSIDIZING THE PERFORMING ARTS (1985).
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increase access without subsidizing the more typical rich and educated arts
audience. One such (private) program, the nonprofit Theater Development
Fund (TDF) in New York City, charges members $5 for tickets to Off-
Off-Broadway shows and pays the theater $7; Broadway tickets may be
priced as low as $28. The program had some limited success in attracting
new audiences, although this effect has leveled off.' 9
In addition to the contestability of their economic assumptions and the
paternalism inherent in identifying the institutions or genres at which
vouchers can be spent, these programs are vulnerable to two criticisms.
First, any large-scale voucher system must overcome considerable
logistical problems, from identifying the members of the beneficiary class
to ensuring that members of this class do not resell tickets. The Theater
Development Fund, for example, is open to students, teachers, union
members, seniors, civil service employees, nonprofit organization
employees, performing arts professionals, and members of the armed
forces and clergy. Some of these groups are already eligible for discounted
tickets at theaters; others seem very imperfect substitutes for income or
education levels, or for a lack of prior arts consumption."0 If a voucher
program were to attempt to defray travel expenses to extend its benefits to
remote populations, this would further compound administrative costs. '1
Second, it is not clear exactly how vouchers would affect arts audiences.
Henry Hansmann's work on nonprofit organizations suggests that "for an
audience-maximizing arts firm a ticket subsidy has no greater effect on
audience size than does a lump sum subsidy, while for the quality
maximizer a ticket subsidy may actually lead to a smaller audience than a
lump-sum subsidy.""' 2 If the only goal were to increase attendance by the
underprivileged, these findings might not be a problem; however, to the
extent that they are part of a broader argument in favor of the arts, the
mere substitution of one kind of audience member for another would be
undesirable, particularly if the quality of the arts or overall attendance
were to suffer.
The access argument for vouchers, and for direct subsidy generally, has
109. www.tdforg. Inflation has cut deeply into the amount of the subsidy; the program is
currently working to restore it. See Interview with William Baumol, supra note 107, at 56.
110. TDF's mission is two fold: to "identify and provide support, including financial assistance,
to theatrical works of artistic merit" and to "encourage and enable diverse audiences to attend live
theatre and dance in all their venues." www.tdforg. This sets up a tension between providing subsidy
to more groups in order to funnel more money to the arts and focusing more narrowly on new
theatergoers; regardless, their membership policy suggests the difficulty of targeting such theatergoers.
11. Alan Peacock, Welfare Economics and Public Subsidies to the Arts, MANCHESTER SCH.
ECON. & Soc. STUD. Dec. 1969, at 323, 333-35, reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECONOMICS 501 (Ruth
Towse ed., 1997).
112. Quoted in Ruth Towse, Achieving Public Policy Objectives in the Arts and Heritage, in
CULTURAL ECONOMICS AND CULTURAL POLICIES 143, 154 (Alan Peacock & Ilde Rizzo eds., 1994),
reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECONOMICS 697 (Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
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been bolstered by reference to information costs.113 If poor consumers do
not actually exhibit unfulfilled demand for the arts, the thinking goes, this
is in large part because they have not been exposed to them. The
controlling inequity is thus a lack of education in taste, the exclusion of
poor consumers from the virtuous cycle whereby some arts experience
awakens the desire for more. Subsidy intended to increase exposure to the
arts would fill this need, and eventually render the subsidy itself obsolete.
This is a potent argument for arts education, albeit one grounded on the
paternalistic assumption that that certain arts will be recognized as
meritorious with the proper training. Its force is undercut, however, by the
fact that opportunities to develop a taste for the arts are present in many
poor communities. Even if this taste could only be acquired through
firsthand experience, it is far from obvious that amateur, school, and (for
the remote but not poor) for-profit programs are unable to provide this
experience."14 Although arts education in low-income school districts may
well be inadequate for many reasons, it seems unlikely that information
costs alone impose serious limits on demand for the arts. Indeed,
increasing access has been an important political concern in discussions of
the NEA since at least the Carter Administration, but a 2002 study shows
that the percentage of adults who have attended traditional "high" arts
events has not increased in the last two decades.115
A final concern about the taste-formation argument is that, like the
naive merit good argument, it provides little policy guidance beyond
calling for the diversion of some amount of money to expose
underprivileged and rural populations to taste-forming art. The benefits of
this program defy quantification, and any attempt to define the class of
taste-forming art would inevitably reduce the argument's qualitative
appeal.' 
16
3. Preservation for Future Generations
Like antiquities and the environment, the techniques and fruits of artistic
endeavor are sometimes considered part of our national heritage or the
heritage of Western civilization. Regardless of current demand for the arts,
a devotee might argue that we have an obligation to support them in order
to preserve and pass on our inheritance to future generations. Rhetoric
supporting federal arts subsidy has employed this sort of language from
the beginning. Hallie Flanagan, the former head of the WPA's Federal
Theatre Project, wrote,
113. See, e.g., NETZER, supra note 17, at 161-64.
114. David Cwi, Public Support to the Arts, 4 J. CULT. ECON. 39, 52 (1980), reprinted in 2
CULTURAL ECONOMICS 514 (Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
115. NEA RESEARCH DIVISION, NOTE 81: 2002 SURVEY OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE ARTS,
at 1.
116. Towse, Achieving Public Policy Objectives in the Arts and Heritage, supra note 112, at 158.
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The Federal theatre came into being because Mr. Harry Hopkins,
administrator of the Works Progress Administration, believed not
only that unemployed theatrical people could get as hungry as
unemployed accountants and engineers, but-and this was much
more extraordinary-that their skills were as worthy of conservation.
He believed that the talents of these professional theater workers,
together with the skills of painters, musicians and writers, made up
part of the national wealth which America could not afford to lose.'
One difficulty with the preservation argument is that it requires an
estimate of what level of cultural activity today would be adequate to
preserve our cultural heritage in the future. This would probably be
impossible to do with much precision, but even in general terms, it would
be quite controversial to claim that the present state of arts funding
threatens the very existence of the arts for posterity.
The conservation argument also requires judgments about what kinds
and forms of culture should be preserved. Should we preserve both
painting and opera? Both individual paintings and painterly technique?
What about reproductions and recordings? And these are the easy issues;
much more divisive is the question of which styles or works should be
preserved. Which painterly techniques must we be able to pass on? Which
paintings should be kept in the country, or on public display? Which plays
should be preserved by live performance, and which can be preserved by
maintaining a video recording or even just the text?18 And what about
contemporary art? As philosopher Noel Carroll has pointed out, "Bluntly,
contemporary art is not our heritage yet, nor is it clear how much of it will
be.""' 9 In the absence of consensus on these issues, the conservation
argument, too, despite its rhetorical force, fails as a guide to specific
policies.
Even at the most general level, other objections arise. First, broad
decisions about preservation assume that we can predict the taste of future
generations, or that we are better positioned than they to know what they
should like. With regard to air purity and global temperatures, scrying
future preferences is easy; with regard to artistic traditions,
prognostication is problematic. Second, what would prevent us from
simply allowing future generations to determine their preferences and
revive any obsolete techniques? Our descendants are likely to be
considerably richer in real terms and to be equipped with more powerful
technology than we are; supporting arts now in order to keep them
available for the future may be a needless and expensive solution, even if
117. Quoted in ZEIGLER, supra note 25, at 7.
118. Cwi, Public Support to the Arts, supra note 114, at 42-43
119. Noel Carroll, Can Government Funding of the Arts Be Justified Theoretically?," in PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE AESTHETIC INTEREST at 68, 69 (Ralph A. Smith & Ronald Berman eds., 1992).
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it could be justified ideologically. 120 Third, in a country as pluralist as the
United States, the need to preserve the arts is complicated by the fact that
traditional Western arts are only a portion of our cultural heritage; indeed,
many people might not regard them as any part of their heritage. It is
obvious, not least from the disparity in government arts funding, that
Americans identify less with the arts than many Europeans, and the power
of the conservation argument is correspondingly weakened.
Each of the arguments considered so far (merit, access, and
preservation) has depended in part on the paternalistic assumption that the
arts or aesthetic experiences are desirable for their own sakes, regardless
of the price they command in the market. This assumption is problematic
in the context of American capitalism, and it was especially problematic
when conservative politicians began to present the arts, as subsidized by
the federal government, as actively anti-meritorious. These attacks
encouraged arts supporters to set aside the assertion that culture is too
important to leave to the market and to adopt instead the tools of the
economist and the language of the market. The next Section will explore
some of the justifications for subsidy that emerged from this new
bilingualism.
B. Taking up the Economist's Tools
Debate over arts subsidies has unquestionably shifted focus since 1965.
The arguments of arts supporters now tend to emphasize the instrumental
value of the arts for other goals like educational achievement and
economic growth. The primary impetu3 for this change was the growing
threat from cultural and political conservatives in the early 1990s, but the
trend has been encouraged by the rise of professional arts policy advocates
and increased interest in the utility of the arts among public and private
development stakeholders. 12' Even the NEA's public statements reflect
this shift: whereas references to the influence of the arts on economic
activity are largely absent from the annual reports of the 1970s, it has now
become one of the agency's key selling points. 122 Some state arts agencies
have even formally aligned themselves with departments of tourism or
economic development. 123 This Section assesses the fruits of this new
emphasis.
120. Cwi, Merit Good or Market Failure, supra note 100, at 72.
121. Elizabeth Strom with Angela Cook, Old Pictures in New Frames, 21 REV. POL'Y RES. 505,
506 (2004).
122. Strom, supra note 121, at 508.
123. Bill Ivey, America Needs a New System for Supporting the Arts," CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Feb. 4, 2005, at B6.
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1. Baumol's Cost Disease
Many of the economic arguments for subsidies advanced by arts
advocates since the early 1990s have their academic origins in the field of
cultural economics, which was founded by the 1966 publication of
William Baumol and William Bowen's Performing Arts: The Economic
Dilemma.124 One of the book's central theses is now referred to as
Baumol's Cost Disease. It was the most widely used economic arguments
for subsidizing arts institutions through the end of the 1970s,125 and it is
still sometimes cited, 126 although its applicability has proved to be limited.
The theory addresses the question of whether art even needs subsidy in
order to thrive. After all, it is for-profit arts organizations that produce
most American art, 127 and a good deal of what they produce, from
Broadway musicals and jazz concerts to independent film and HBO
miniseries, has earned critical accolades using investments rather than
donations. Even non-profit arts prospered in this country for more than
150 years without significant federal subsidy.
12 8
Addressing this fundamental question, Baumol and Bowen argued that
some arts, including most performing arts, will gradually become
unsustainable in the market because of strict limits on productivity that
cannot alleviated by new technology. The Brandenburg Concertos occupy
the same number of musicians for the same number of hours today as they
did in the eighteenth century; it is hard to imagine any development that
would allow a person to fiddle faster without disturbing the tempo. This
effect does not hold for most other industries, where technology increases
the productivity of labor and reduces the need for labor inputs. Over time,
this disparity will raise relative input costs and thus relative prices,
constricting expansion of the artistic sector. 29 As computer and cell phone
technology gets cheaper and cheaper, opera tickets will only become more
expensive. While this may not eliminate the arts entirely, it is likely to
reduce the professionalism, quality, and variety of arts experiences
available if the government does not step in. Baumol himself has recently
pointed to the rise of the blockbuster movie and Broadway play to suggest
that rising prices will crowd out more experimental work, and he has
noted that the cost of arts events has increased approximately 100% more
than inflation since World War II-the same rate as a visit to a doctor,
124. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS: THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA
(1966). See Ruth Towse, Introduction in I CULTURAL ECONOMICS xiii, xiii (Ruth Towse ed., 1997);
Saunders, supra note 99, at 600.
125. NETZER, supra note 17, at 74.
126. See, e.g., Interview with William Baumol, supra note 107.
127. Cwi, Merit Good or Market Failure, supra note 100, at 71.
128. A BRIEF CHRONICLE OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 18.
129. Peacock, Welfare Economics and Public Subsidies to the Arts, supra note 111, at 323-25.
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which exhibits a similar cost disease. 130
Many economists have questioned the applicability of cost disease to
the arts, on several grounds. First, the theory neglects the extent to which
technology does increase productivity in the arts. One obvious example is
broadcast technology, which allows a given performance to reach a much
larger audience with very little degradation of sound or video quality.
Viewers outside the concert hall contribute to the income of the orchestra,
so that the purest experience-listening to the concerto performed by
actual instruments only feet away-is subsidized by the new audience
made possible by telecommunications. To the extent that ticket prices
have increased anyway, this may well be the result of other factors, such
as reduced demand for Bach-or at least for live Bach, since recording
technology represents another obvious means of increasing the effective
productivity of artists.
A related argument, rarely advanced in the literature, is that technology
may actually improve the artistic experience, justifying any increased cost.
Technology enabling better acoustics, truer instruments, and more discreet
hearing aids would all presumably increase the desirability of and demand
for aesthetic experience. Some economists have also argued that the
empirical evidence indicates that cost disease cannot in fact be responsible
for increases in the prices of the arts. Edwin G. West undertakes to prove
that real unit costs in the performing arts decreased during the 1970s;131 if
prices increased despite this, Baumol's theory may overlook the inability
of arts organizations to use their resources efficiently thanks to poor
management. 132
Even if technology does inevitably lead to higher relative prices for the
arts, this may not affect the level of service demanded or provided,
particularly since technology also increases relative wealth.'33 The wealth
effect may increase demand for tickets, and for opportunities to donate to
the arts. The elasticity of demand for the arts may also be quite low: the
price of high arts attendance increased faster than the Retail Price Index in
the 1980s, but attendance itself did, too. 134 Economists have also noted
that the existence of cost disease alone would not call for federal arts
subsidy; even if the arts were in danger of becoming less competitive,
supporters would need to develop a separate argument for the value of
preserving them-or preserving the variety supported during a less
technologically-advanced era-despite their lack of market viability. 35
130. Interview with William Baumol, supra note 107, at 54.
131. See WEST, SUBSIDIZING THE PERFORMING ARTS, supra note 108.
132. Cwi, Merit Good or Market Failure, supra note 100, at 76.
133. Peacock, Welfare Economics and Public Subsidies to the Arts, supra note 111, at 327.
134. Towse, Achieving Public Policy Objectives in the Arts and Heritage, supra note 112, at 156.
See also Cwi, Public Support to the Arts, supra note 114, at 53.
135. Saunders, supra note 99, at 601.
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Baumol's analysis, if accurate, might even raise equity concerns about
NEA-style direct subsidy. If constant labor prices were driving up the
relative price of some art forms, a general subsidy policy might
differentially encourage art forms with higher input costs-the ones that
tend to be favored by the rich and educated. 3 6 It is an open question
whether the distribution of taste for opera, say, is caused by cost disease,
although its pre-modern association with the upper class suggests
otherwise. Regardless, a policy explicitly favoring high-cost arts at the
expense of more popular forms of entertainment would be in effect a
subsidy for the rich; supporting this would require much the same
paternalism assumed in the arguments explored in the previous Section.
2. Economic Impact Studies
The most popular kind of economic argument for subsidy today seeks to
avoid the problem of paternalism, meeting the market on its own
assumptions by asserting the economic benefits of artistic activity. The
link between the arts and commerce is by no means new: one arts lover in
the 1850s declared that "the city of America which first possesses a fine
gallery of art will become the Florence of this continent in that respect,
reaping a reward in reputation and money sufficient to convince the
closest calculator of the dollar that no better investment could have been
made."' 37 But in the decades since the 19 70s, assertions of this link,
especially using economic impact (El) studies, have become the most
widely funded form of arts research138 and, according to some advocates,
the "most potent" tool, "the one that resonates most with elected leaders,
public and private sector funders, and policymakers"' 3 9 because it
connects the arts, a relatively unpopular electoral plank, with improving
the economy.
The advantage of this sort of argument is obvious: the government need
not donate to art for art's sake but should instead invest in art for the sake
of the economy. A slew of studies have attempted to quantify the
economic benefits of arts, which boost tourism, seduce desirable residents
and businesses, and attract investments in infrastructure. 4 ' The trend is by
no means restricted to arts advocacy; a recent article on a local Seattle
136. NETZER, supra note 17, at 33.
137. Quoted in Strom, supra note 121, at 507.
138. Arthur H. Stemgold, Do Economic Impact Studies Misrepresent the Benefits of Arts and
Cultural Organizations, J. ARTS MGMT., L., & Soc'y, Fall 2004, at 166, 167.
139. Randy Cohen, William Schaffer, & Benjamin Davidson, Arts and Economic Prosperity, J.
ARTS MGMT., L., & Soc'Y, Spring 2003, at 17, 17.
140. JOSHUA GUETZKOW, CENTER FOR ARTS AND CULTURAL POLICY STUDIES WORKING PAPER
20: HOW THE ARTS IMPACT COMMUNITIES, at 8 (2002). The appeal to tourism suggests a certain
tension between the economic development argument and the earlier argument from access: to the
extent that a program of arts support is designed for visitors, it may not be well suited to spreading
access within the city or region in question.
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website headlined "A Study of Seattle Media Obsession with Studies"
counted seven organizations that had recently released El studies in bids
for state money, including the Sonics, NASCAR fans, the bio-tech
industry, and the Washington tree-fruit industry.'
4 1
The recent wrangling over President Obama's first economic stimulus
package demonstrates the pervasiveness of El-inspired arts advocacy. The
$50 million earmark for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) that
was included by the House and removed by the Senate made up a tiny
portion of the $787 billion spending bill, 142 but it provoked intense
lobbying by arts supporters including Robert Redford and dismissive
judgment of the value of the arts from conservatives like Senator Tom
Cobum, who sponsored an amendment that would have prevented
stimulus funds from being directed to support of the arts, as well as
casinos and golf courses. 143 In the end, the NEA funding was included in
the bill passed by both houses of Congress on February 13, 2009, the
Coburn Amendment's restriction was removed, and the arts community
celebrated. "'It's a huge victory for the arts in America,' said Robert L.
Lynch, the president of Americans for the Arts (AFA), a lobbying group.
'It's a signal that maybe there is after all more understanding of the value
of creativity in the 21 st-century economy. '144
Given the nature of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, it may not be surprising that pro-NEA lobbying adopted the
language of economic stimulus. Arts leaders, state officials, and celebrities
all pointed to the "creative economy" as an important employer and source
of other economic activity. 145 In his phone call to Speaker Nancy Pelosi,
Redford pointed out that "his Sundance Film Festival brings more than
$60 million to Park City, Utah each year." Kate D. Levin, cultural affairs
commissioner for New York City, made the point succinctly. "One of the
profound things about culture is the amount of indirect employment and
spending it generates," she said. "Even the smallest organization can
record the fact that the parking lot down the street and the dry cleaner
around the comer and the restaurant nearby all do better when the
141. Knute Berger, A Study of Seattle Media Obsession with Studies, CROSSCUT SEATTLE,
http://crosscut.com/m ossback3899/A +study+of+Seattle+media +obsession +with +studies (June 7,
2007).
142. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Obama Signs Stimulus into Law, WALL STREET J., Feb. 18, 2009,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB]23487951033799545.html.
143. See, e.g., Robin Pogrebin, Saving Federal Arts Funds: Selling Culture As an Economic
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2OO9/02/J6/arts/J6mone.html.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Elizabeth Blair, Stimulus Package Includes Millions for the Arts, All Things
Considered, NPR, Jan 27, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99916513; Michael Kranish, Stimulus Funding
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organization is functioning."' 46 But the tone of this debate is common
among arts promoters in many other contexts today.
The most prominent and broad-based arts El study is Arts & Economic
Prosperity III, released in 2005 by Americans for the Arts. The
organization boasts that it "documents the key role played by the nonprofit
arts and culture industry in strengthening our nation's economy.... [and]
demonstrates that the nonprofit arts and culture industry is an economic
driver in communities-a growth industry that supports jobs, generates
government revenue, and is the cornerstone of tourism." Estimating that
"the nonprofit arts and culture industry generates $166.2 billion in
economic activity every year," the report itemizes the benefits: 5.7 million
full-time equivalent jobs, $104.2 billion in household income, and nearly
$30 billion in local, state, and federal tax revenue.
147
The Americans for the Arts report, like most economic impact studies,
was expressly designed to help advocates persuade state or local
authorities to invest in the arts. Such studies are much less persuasive at
the national level, so that even if state and local government should be
swayed by them (a proposition challenged below), the NEA should not.
Most of the effect of investing in the arts, particularly in the short term,
involves diverting artistic resources from one place to another: if Seattle
funds a new nonprofit theater organization, it will draw actors, directors,
and technicians from the surrounding area. This will, of course, affect the
local economy, but largely at the expense of neighboring economies. El
studies often do not show that the arts actually generate wealth; the
numbers may well be reached almost entirely by relocating it. At the
national level, the economic gains and losses induced by NEA grants may
essentially cancel out.'
48
In theory, this problem could be incorporated into an El study designed
to demonstrate that national investment of the arts over time would also
generate more artistic activity and, in turn, more economic benefit.
However, the weaknesses of existing studies do not inspire confidence that
such a well-designed study, even if possible, is forthcoming. In a
frequently asked questions section for lobbyists on its website, the
organization acknowledges that El studies have come under fire from
some economists, but defend their methodology:
You can be confident that the input-output analysis used in this study
is a highly regarded model in the field of economics (the basis of two
Nobel Prizes in economics). However, as in any professional field,
there is disagreement about procedures, jargon, and the best way to
146. Pogrebin, supra note 143.
147. Americans for the Arts, Homepage: Arts & Econ Prosperity III,
http.//www.artsusa.org/infonration-resources/research-information/services/economic-impact/defau
It.asp (2005).
148. Sterngold, supra note 138, at 169-170.
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determine results. Ask 12 artists to define art and you will get 24
answers; expect the same of economists. You may meet an economist
who believes that these studies should be done differently.
149
This pre-emptive defense was not crafted out of an abundance of
caution. Economic impact studies have been criticized by economists for a
variety of reasons, leading one to characterize the studies generally as "a
parody of economic analysis."15 Some of the more technical critiques
involve the difficulty of discounting local expenditures that are simply
diverted from other existing activities or accurately generalizing from
local economic statistics.15" ' These technical concerns lie outside this
paper, but it is worth noting that "nearly every economist who reviews
'economic' impact studies of the arts expresses concern over the
technological and practical limitations of the methodologies."' 52
The less technical concerns include the fact that some of these studies
(especially earlier ones) use only gross measures of economic impact,
ignoring the substitution effects of arts spending.'53 The fact that arts
activities have some economic impact is unremarkable; the relevant
question is whether they are the best means to achieve this impact. The
arts may also generate some negative economic impact such as noise
pollution, which these studies generally ignore.' 54 Without demonstrating
that the arts are the best way to boost the economy, El studies do not show
market failure.' 55 Only if no better alternative were available could issues
like collective action problems justify government intervention, and then
only with further argument. 1
56
El studies also confront the difficulty of defining the nonprofit arts and
culture industry (NACO, to the horror of any poets being promoted),
sometimes quite creatively. Different studies count different groups,
sometimes including organizations as diverse as professional opera
companies, amateur theatrical troupes, and major league sports teams. 57 It
is telling that two of the most rigorous and disinterested El studies,
conducted by the NEA in 1977 and 1981, concluded that "there was
universal agreement. . . that artistic and cultural amenities by themselves
149. Americans for the Arts, FAQ: Arts & Econ Prosperity III,
http://www.artsusa.org/information resources/research-informatin/servies/economicimpact/003.a
sp (2005).
150. Bruce A. Seaman, CVM vs. Economic Impact, Jan. 2002, available at
http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/CVMpapers/Seaman.html.
151. Id.
152. Christopher Madden, Using 'Economic' Impact Studies in Arts and Cultural Advocacy,
MEDIA INT'L INCORPORATING CULT. & POL'Y, Feb. 2001, at 161, 165.
153. Sterngold, supra note 138, at 169.
154. GUETZKOW, supra note 140, at 19.
155. Madden, supra note 152, at 161.
156. Id. at 170.
157. GUETZKOW, supra note 140, at 12.
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are not a determining factor in industrial location decisions" and that "one
cannot conclude that support for the arts, given particular economic goals
such as the creation of jobs, is more desirable than other uses of public
dollars." '158
To the extent that El encourages bidding for artistic capital among
various local governments, they may actually invite economic waste.
Informed participants in this process will presumably bid the price of
artistic resources up to the level of the expected economic gains, so that
the net economic impact is actually zero, even locally. 159 Any temporary
gains would prompt parallel investment in nearby communities, so that an
equilibrium of artistic resources would be restored after a potentially
costly arms race. 160 Alternatively, bidding may lead to a regulatory race to
the bottom, generating negative externalities in, for example, tax policy;
these costs are not accounted for in El studies. 161 Finally, the authors of El
studies should be careful what they wish for. Even if they persuade local
leaders to invest in artistic infrastructure, those politicians may base their




Economic impact studies often fail to show that the arts actually
generate wealth (as opposed to diverting it from nearby markets), but
another line of argument for subsidies hopes to suggest that they do. This
sort of advocacy points to mutual reinforcement among developments in
creative undertakings in science, industry, design, and the arts. Innovation
in the arts thus spurs development of the economy and industry in indirect
ways, so that more artistic activity would not simply redistribute
resources; it would actually create innovative capital. One gallery owner
in Rochester, New York, illustrates the ways arts can enrich everyday life
by pointing to designer bathroom fixtures, which draw on principles of
design developed by artists. 163 Economist and painter Hans Abbing makes
an even broader claim, arguing that the arts shape our very perspective of
the world:
The introduction of central perspective [in painting] reforms the image
of the world as we perceive it. We begin looking at reality in a different
158. Quoted in Strom, supra note 121, at 508 n.2.
159. Tyler Cowen, When Should Regions Bid for Artistic Resources, 20 Rev. Austrian Econ. 1, 2
(2007).
160. Don Fullerton, On Justifications for Public Support of the Arts, 15 J. CULT. ECON. 67, 74-5
(1991), reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECONOMICS 559 (Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
161. Cowen, When Should Regions Bid for Artistic Resources, supra note 154, at 3.
162. Id. at 5.
163. E. Catherine Salibian & Paul Ericson, Roundtable: Public Funding of the Arts, ROCHESTER
Bus. J., Oct. 29, 1990, at A12. See also Edwin G. West, Arts Vouchers to Replace Grants, ECON.
AFF., Feb.-Mar. 1986, 9, reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECONOMICS 665 (Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
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way. Romanticism opens our eyes to nature. With surrealism we start
seeing things behind things.... And through our often retarded and
indirect acquaintance with constructivism and futurism, at last we really
dare to face the new forms of our industries and workshops. 'I
The high value of artistic innovation, the argument goes, derives in part
from its experimental nature, which in turn means a high failure rate of
individual undertakings. These failures win no friends in the market, but
they are valuable to society because other artists or thinkers in other fields
may learn from them.'65 Even when an artist is successful, she will be
inadequately rewarded for her success because much of its value cannot be
internalized-it is impossible to copyright the innovative principle of a
new technique or style.'66 In this respect, art is akin to pure science: in
both cases, it is generally quite difficult to control intellectual property
rights through price exclusion or secrecy.' 67 In order to realize the benefits
of innovative arts, then, the government should provide subsidies to bring
the rewards of artistic activity more in line with the capital it generates.
Economist Tyler Cowen, a vigorous advocate of indirect subsidies to the
arts, characterizes this justification as advocating "investing in
decentralization [of innovation] and nonprofits as a way of improving
society," which is an argument for arts subsidies that might even withstand
comparison to (other) antipoverty programs. 1
68
Cowen concedes, however, that the argument does not single out the
arts for special support; it situates the arts as one innovative activity to be
supported along with many others. 69 If the government is going to
allocate money to redress market failure due to risk and uncertainty, what
proportion of that money should go to the arts? Quantifying the benefits of
any sort of innovation is difficult, which is part of the reason why the
market supposedly fails in the first place; since the most obvious
ramifications of artistic innovation are on other artists, it is especially
difficult to trace the influence of a given artistic endeavor, successful or
otherwise, on the economy. This murkiness complicates the justification;
supporters tout the power of the arts to generate capital, but cannot show
that subsidy for the arts will, at the margin, be at least as good an
innovative investment as a similar subsidy for chemistry. 7 ° If the goal is
164. Hans Abbing, On the Rationale of Public Support to the Arts, in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE
ARTS, at 34, 38-39 (William S. Hendon et al., eds., 1980), reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECONOMICS 538
(Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
165. DeGrazia, supra note 31, at 152 (citing NETZER, supra note 17, at 24).
166. JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 208
(1993).
167. Abbing, supra note 159, at 40.
168. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 139.
169. Id. at 24.
170. Towse, Achieving Public Policy Objectives in the Arts and Heritage, supra note 112, at 145-
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really to promote the economy, the most natural conclusion may be that
technological and industrial research should get the bulk of any innovation
subsidy; arts advocates would have trouble demonstrating otherwise.
The economic argument from innovation holds some potential, then,
although its power is limited. To the extent it succeeds, it seems to call
particularly for indirect subsidy. Tyler Cowen points out that government
is poorly situated to identify the individual innovators who are most likely
to generate useful ideas or products. For one thing, "[n]o single institution
will be able to spot more than a small number of winners, due to limited
resources and the intrinsic difficulty of the task." Even as one funding
institution among many, "[m]ost deliberate governmental attempts to
stimulate the discovery process have failed, and for reasons that Hayek
and other economists have outlined. Government does not have the
knowledge needed to centrally plan innovation."''
Because the focus of this Note is direct federal subsidies, a thorough
examination of the merits of indirect subsidy is beyond its scope, although
there is an obvious argument that encouraging private gifts through tax
breaks favors the tastes of the wealthy. (Indeed, in 1997, nearly 58% of
private giving came from the top income decile.172) Regardless of the
power of indirect subsidy to spur innovation, direct subsidy holds little
promise in this regard. Certainly the NEA's historical preference for
traditional arts and established organizations seems a losing strategy for
encouraging experimentation." 3 More generally, the frequent failure that
accompanies experimental arts makes them unappealing to politicians
accountable to taxpayers for any perceived failures.
174
4. Contingent Valuation Surveys
As an alternative to El studies, arts advocates also try to demonstrate
that the public values artistic activity much more highly than the market.
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a technique drawn from
environmental advocacy that uses surveys to assess people's willingness
to pay (WTP) for the availability of cultural opportunities or their
willingness to accept (WTA) money for the foreclosure of cultural
opportunities. The assumption is that the aggregate WTP for art will
exceed its market value because, for example, people believe they benefit
from having the arts around, or they expect to attend an arts event
someday and would be willing to contribute to keep that option open, or
171. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 21-22, 47.
172. Brooks, In Search of True Public Arts Support, supra note 12, at 94.
173. Towse, Achieving Public Policy Objectives in the Arts and Heritage, supra note 112, at 156.
174. Direct support of opera in Germany, for example, has not led to a widespread performance of
new work. Of the nearly 300 operas performed in Germany since World War 11, 200 were written in
the twentieth century, but these new works accounted for less than 10% of all performances.
Pommerehne, supra note 98, at 75-76.
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they would like their children to inherit a city with an art museum, even if
they never visit it themselves. 75 Environmental groups use CVM to place
a numerical value on resources like air quality that are not traded directly
on the market; arts groups use CVM to show that the market price of art
does not capture its true value. Since collective action problems, other
market failure, or simple inequality must be behind this discrepancy, the
argument goes, the government should intervene to set things right. A
simple version of this principle is at work in a recent survey of British
employees that found that 41% wanted discounted tickets to arts
establishments but only 32% wanted gym benefits. The group that
commissioned the survey suggested that companies should therefore spend
at least as much money on arts perks as gym memberships.
17 6
CVM surveys are fraught with problems, and many economists believe
that reliable instruments have not yet been developed-and may never be.
Richard Epstein, who views the device as a necessary evil in some
contexts, believes that most surveys "tend[] to overestimate the value of'
the public goods they study. 17 7 Among the problems he identifies are the
near impossibility of using CVM to value a resource from the ground up,
the difficulty of deducting the opportunity costs of artistic activity, and the
legerdemain involved in aggregating the results of a survey, which could
translate many individuals' willingness to contribute $1 to support a local
writer into a titanic salary for a state poet laureate. 1
78
Bruce Seaman and Cass Sunstein, who are even more critical of CVM
studies, expand some of these concerns. According to Seaman, the
surveys, like economic impact studies, not only fail adequately to assess
opportunity cost, but also tend to underestimate the effect of negative
externalities by framing questions to expect a positive valuation. He also
believes that "both approaches are subject to serious aggregation
anomalies where extending the results of one study to similar cases can
imply absurd results," as when the WTP for a few local cultural
institutions is extrapolated to all of them, quickly exhausting the local
treasury.1
79
Sunstein emphasizes the problem of framing. 80 If respondents are asked
without context how much they would be willing to pay to support a
community theater, they will probably not be able to give a meaningful
answer. Some surveys have attempted to address this difficulty by
175. Id. at 79.
176. Peter Aspden, Workers 'Favour Arts Subsidies over Gym', FIN. TIMES, Sep. 29, 2004, at 6.
177. Richard A. Epstein, The Regrettable Necessity of Contingent Valuation, 27 J. CULT. ECON.
259 (2003).
178. Id.
179. Seaman, CVM vs. Economic Impact, supra note 150.
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providing information about current levels of subsidy, by asking how the
respondent would value each of several disparate items, or by asking
multiple choice questions, but each of these techniques will affect the
answer in a predictable, but not necessarily accurate, direction. In one
experiment, the reported WTP for coral reef preservation and for bone
marrow cancer research, each asked in isolation, was $70; when the two
were assessed together, coral reefs got about $60 and cancer research
about $105.181 It is impossible to frame the question in a neutral way that
would not invite strategic exaggeration. Even if we assume away
malicious preferences, WTP is only a stand in for utility, and it is a very
crude proxy. Sunstein also advances a further difficulty, namely how to
translate WTP responses into government policy. He argues that
government is not meant to be "a maximizing machine, with the goal of
aggregating preferences in accordance with the market model."
' 182
Even if CVM surveys were not deeply flawed, it is unclear whether they
would actually show a need for more federal arts subsidies. One
Australian CVM study that attempted to correct for some of these
methodological problems concluded that residents of Syndey, Australia
supported a two- to three-fold increase in national subsidy. 183 However, a
relatively sophisticated Canadian study found that public arts spending in
Ontario was about right.1 84 No national CVM survey has been undertaken
in the United States, but the General Social Survey inquired about
government spending on culture and the arts in 1985, 1990, and 1996. An
average of 41.6% of respondents thought that current funding levels were
appropriate; 15% favored greater spending, and 43.4% wanted less. CVM
is by no means guaranteed to reveal an undervaluation of the arts in this
country.
Regardless of what they might show, WTP surveys do not seem to
outperform consumption and donation levels as indicators of individual
taste. "The decisive Hayekian insight was that no system of centralized
planning could provide" the level of information available in a free
market, "even if it used the techniques of contingent valuation."' 85 In the
end, CVM may offer supporters of arts subsidies little more than
quantitative flair.
5. A Note on the Limitations of Market Analysis
These attempts to use econometric tools, which would be one way to
181. Id. at 3.
182. Id. at 7.
183. David Throsby & Glenn A. Withers, What Price Culture?, 9 J. CULT. ECON. 1, 27-28 (1985),
reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECONOMICS 577 (Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
184. William G. Morrison & Edwin G. West, Subsidies for the Performing Arts, 15 J. BEHAV.
ECON. 57, 66 (1986), reprinted in 2 CULTURAL ECONOMICS (Ruth Towse ed., 1997).
185. Epstein, supra note 177.
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avoid the paternalism of the merit good and related arguments, have not
developed into clear and convincing arguments for direct federal arts
subsidies. Given their weak persuasive force, it is possible that they may
do arts advocates more harm than good, because the language of the
market carries with it several risks.
One hazard of this sort of economic analysis is that it may lead to
further economic reasoning.186 The idea of market failure depends on an
assessment of the right amount, variety, and quality of artistic activity. If
the benefits of the arts are financial, the calculation of the desirable
amount of the arts may take place in comparison to the economic value of
related events like Boy and Girl Scout troops or baseball games, or even of
less comparable policies like low property taxes or public
transportation.' 87 This could lead to an "optimal" level much lower than
arts advocates would like-and possibly lower than current levels.
More broadly, government intervention in the arts guided by the hope of
economic gain may provide additional funding at the price of values the
arts community holds dear. "Financial objectives are not everywhere
harmonious with artistic or cultural objectives, so government intervention
will at best be only coincidentally consistent with cultural objectives."' 88
Some artistic activities might be regarded as more useful economically
than others, resulting in differential funding among organizations that
seem arbitrary from the aesthetic perspective. 
8 9
Since market arguments may establish cultural policy as a "mere
adjunct to policies aimed at wealth or job creation,"'1 90 it is tempting to
abandon them, admitting that "[i]t may be better, all things considered, to
have a less efficient but more beautiful society."' 9' Better, perhaps, to use
arguments that offer no policy guidance than ones that point to policies
advocates may not like. But this would leave supporters without a strong
argument for direct subsidy-unless an economic argument could be
found that emphasizes the inherent benefits of the arts rather than the
language of the market. There currently appears to be a trend in arts policy
research toward just such an argument: the argument from externalities.
C. Benefits Beyond the Buyer
Externalities are benefits (or costs) that extend beyond the parties to a
transaction, the value of which is thus not included in the market price.
The strongest argument for government intervention based on externalities
arises in the case of public goods, like national defense, from the use of
186. Cwi, Public Support to the Arts, supra note 114, at 56.
187. GUrETZKOW, supra note 140, at 18.
188. Madden, supra note 152, at 172.
189. Cwi, Merit Good or Market Failure, supra note 100, at 8 1.
190. Madden, supra note 152, at 172.
191. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 13.
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which it is virtually impossible to exclude individuals (they are
nonexcludable goods) and which can be "consumed" by an individual
without diminishing the next person's use of the good (they are nonrival
goods). 192 The arts are generally not pure public goods-much of the
value of a volume of poetry or a poetry reading recurs to the poet and the
organizers of the publication or event on one hand and the readership or
audience on the other. However, even exclusive and expensive arts events
may have benefits that are nonexcludable and nonrival. 193 In this respect
they are like hygiene and education: just as a clean and well-informed
citizenry enhances life in a society, the argument goes, so, too, does a
cultivated citizenry. 1
94
This kind of argument is by no means new. Some of the justifications
for subsidy examined in the last Section, particularly contingent valuation
and the argument from innovation, were based on externalities. However,
as market arguments, these emphasized economic benefits at the expense
of less quantifiable ones. In the Canadian contingent valuation survey
mentioned in the last Section, nonusers of the arts who nevertheless
supported public subsidy were asked what benefits led them to this
intriguing position. Forty percent could not explain themselves. Of those
who mentioned specific benefits, most cited their own potential use (20%)
or that of their children (11%); only a few mentioned less tangible benefits
like national pride (7%) and educational importance (7%). (Interestingly,
respondents seemed most skeptical about the central claim of economic
impact studies: only 2% cited the ability of the culture industry to attract
business.)'95 When economists Werner W. Pommerehne and Bruno S.
Frey catalogued the "public-good components, or positive external
effects" of the arts in 1990, they included only option, existence (as of
historic buildings), bequest, prestige, and innovation value.
This Section considers externality arguments of a different sort, based
primarily on less tangible benefits inherent to the arts. Aside from
prestige, they have largely been glossed over by economists, perhaps
because they lend themselves to inspiring rhetoric but not to the kind of
quantification that would aid policymakers. 96 While it is true that many of
these arguments must currently leave precise amounts of funding to the
192. Cwi, Public Support to the Arts, supra note 114, at 41
193. Saunders, supra note 99, at 593.
194. Peacock, Welfare Economics and Public Subsidies to the Arts, supra note I 11, at 329-30.
Although it might at first seem as though public museums are a public good, in fact they simply take a
good that is rival and excludable-access to a painting, say-and use government funding to minimize
its rival-ness (by extending its reach to a large swath of the public) and excludability (by theoretically
providing access to anyone who makes the trip). Visual art provided through public museums does not
become a public good in the economic sense, any more than subsistence money provided through
welfare does; this is merely a device to increase access.
195. Morrison, supra note 184, at 69.
196. Cwi, Public Support to the Arts, supra note 114, at 55.
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political process, economists and students of arts policy have lately begun
taking them more seriously.'97 Although not all of these benefits can form
the basis of persuasive cases for direct federal subsidy, the strongest
justification emerges from an argument from externality.
1. Beauty
The most obvious externality of many artistic activities is the aesthetic
enrichment of passersby or free riders. This effect is clearest for
architecture or public sculpture (which approach the status of pure public
goods), but it is also at play when a catchy song from a new musical is
spread by the amateur imitations of attendees or when a product designer
takes his inspiration from an exhibit at a local art gallery. The arts make
the world a more beautiful place, and not just for those who buy tickets.
Obvious though this point may be, it makes for a deeply problematic
justification of direct subsidy. The most fundamental difficulty is the
broad variety in American taste. Our judgments of beauty are as diverse as
our politics. Comparing the United States to Europe on this regard, Tyler
Cowen notes, "The American citizenry, more ethnically diverse in nature,
and less connected to historical high culture, cannot target direct subsidies
with equal facility."' 98 For example, a poll taken during the NEA crisis
found that an overwhelming majority of respondents felt that "[a]rtistic
excellence can be found in popular and folk culture just as much as in the
fine arts." '199 Unaccountable taste is why much public "art"-from elevator
music to waiting-room painting-aims not for maximum achievement but
minimum offense.
Because we cannot agree on what is good-or even beautiful-art, the
force of the aesthetic enrichment argument is diluted. In fact, my aesthetic
enjoyment of the world may be diminished by the irritating theatergoers
who foist Broadway showtunes on me as I stroll through the park, or by
the eyesore of a sculpture that I have to walk around each morning on my
way to work, or by the expense of the designer home furnishings I have to
sift through when I buy a new house. As we have seen from the
controversies over Serrano and Mapplethorpe, some might find works of
art not only unattractive but actively offensive. Subsidizing art based on
aesthetic externalities, even if a net gain in society's perception of beauty,
would enrich some at the expense of others. This risk is compounded by
the power of government grants to divert private donations. Since
individual gifts often follow NEA money, the government's taste
effectively selects projects not only for public but also for private support,
197. See, e.g., the RAND Corporation's comprehensive 2004 study of these benefits. MCCARTHY,
supra note 95.
198. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 45.
199. Quoted in Ivey, supra note 123.
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undermining the diversity of aesthetic standards that art will appeal to.
A skeptic might also wonder about the effect of direct subsidy on the
quality of aesthetic experience provided by the arts. Some economists fear
that government assistance may distort the market, attracting people to
artistic professions who might be better suited to other things and
crowding out those most capable of providing enrichment. 00 For the
artists who remain, subsidies may stifle personal creativity by
undermining intrinsic motivation.201 As the most recent NEA Chair, Dana
Gioia, has noted, the financial "rigors of serving Milton's 'thankless
Muse' also delivered the collective cultural benefit of frightening away all
but committed artists. 20 2
Even if direct subsidy could be channeled to suitable creators, this
argument must still reckon with the economic bugbear of efficiency.
Direct subsidy has historically been aimed primarily at arts institutions,
perhaps in recognition of the government's inability to select talented
artists directly. This means that the bulk of subsidy money has gone to
construction and infrastructure rather than directly to production. "To
some extent at least, increased subsidy is absorbed by higher pay for
producers of art, including star solo performers and rich painters and
sculptors as well as starving actors, dancers, and assistant curators." This
is akin to subsidizing contractors in order to increase home ownership.20 3
One solution to the problem of efficiency, the peer-review panels that
used to award grants directly to artistic creators, raises problems of its
own. As we have seen, these panels tend to stifle innovation, since
members of the arts community will favor repeat players they are likely to
encounter in their private lives. This makes funding new artists, or even
choosing artists solely on the basis of aesthetic experience, difficult.
20 4
This point is reinforced by comparing the WPA and Treasury Section
programs discussed in Part II. Compared to the Treasury Section's
program using expert panels to select artists, the WPA's policy of mass,
sometimes indiscriminate funding proved unquestionably more successful
at generating desirable aesthetic experience, if the consensus of posterity
is any judge.20 5 If the argument from aesthetic externality has any validity
for direct subsidy, then, it would seem to call for a very different means of
distributing funds than the expert panels employed by the NEA.
200. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, Should the Government Subsidize the Arts?, in PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE AESTHETIC INTEREST 52, 57 (Ralph A. Smith & Ronald Berman eds., 1992); HANS
ABBING, WHY ARE ARTISTS POOR (2002).
201. BRUNO S. FREY, ARTS AND ECONOMICS 149 (2000).
202. DANA GIOIA, CAN POETRY MATTER? 11 (2002).
203. NETZER, supra note 17, at 33-34.
204. Peacock, Economics, Cultural Values, and Cultural Policies, supra note 101, at 16-17.
205. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 70.
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2. Prestige
Another externality cited by advocates of arts subsidy is the prestige that
accrues to a country with prominent and excellent artistic institutions. The
state has an obvious interest in fostering pride in national identity and
respectability among nations and perhaps an obligation to do so. It would
be an embarrassment if the United States were regarded as culturally
backward, and it may be just as shameful that many American artists,
particularly in the fine performing arts like opera, depend on European
engagements to support themselves." 6 Rather, we should be as a sculpture
on a hill, showcasing artistic freedom and accomplishment for other
nations and earning the admiration of the Third World.20 7
This line of thinking figured prominently in the creation of the NEA
during the Cold War. Indeed, the Eisenhower Administration spent more
on cultural outreach programs in real terms than has been spent in total on
the NEA.2°8 Since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the
culture wars, the argument from prestige has lost popularity and force, but
there are signs of revival amid today's clash of civilizations and the War
on Terror. Artistic activity is one way to burnish the image of the United
States abroad, especially in the Middle East-as long as the art selected
does not offend local beliefs. Rendering the American perspective
palatable through entertainment has deep roots; Mormon missionaries in
Paris in the mid-1960s enticed potential converts with music and
basketball, 2°9 and Congress in the new millennium has spent millions of
dollars on Arabic-language radio and TV stations, which often mix local
entertainment with news from an American perspective. 21 0 The State
Department has enlisted the NEA in this effort: the two agencies recently
reinstated an advisory committee to recommend artists to represent the
United States and international arts exhibitions.21
This argument calls specifically for direct subsidy, as opposed to market
support for the arts or indirect subsidy. One implicit assumption is that
market support for the arts is inadequate, either because no private arts
expenditures, no matter how large, can compete with public support as a
means of demonstrating a national commitment to the arts, or because the
large private American art market is supported by relatively few buyers in
comparison to the equally thriving market for less prestigious products.
206. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 91.
207. LEVY, supra note 22, at 105. Note that this argument assumes that the existence or vibrancy
of an art market is not sufficient to secure prestige, but that government spending is (also) necessary.
208. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 74.
209. Michael Kranish & Michael Paulson, The Making of Mitt Romney: Centered in Faith, A
Family Emerges, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2007.
210. COWEN, GOOD& PLENTY, supra note 3, at 77.
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Similarly, although indirect subsidy may enhance prestige by generally
promoting arts and creativity, direct federal grants declares much more
forcefully that the government-and the people who elect it--cherish the
arts, which is a civilized position worthy of international admiration. Of
course, this tends to make the NEA an arm of the State Department, since
it ties the purpose of subsidy to foreign policy, but arts supporters might
not mind this if it leads to greater funding of the arts without too much
government interference with content.
However, it is unclear just how much prestige can be bought with direct
arts subsidy. From the international perspective, the commitments of many
other Western nations to direct spending to secure a thriving artistic
environment seem likely to outweigh any small increases in American
federal arts spending. A stronger worry arises from the domestic point of
view. To the extent that the argument from prestige emphasizes national
pride, it is vulnerable to the criticism that the nonprofit arts are a poor way
of achieving that pride. Americans' national identity appears to be more
closely tied to technological, economic, athletic, and even military
achievement than to culture.212 To the extent that we do take pride in our
national arts, we often boast of the popular movies and music that are
consumed so widely throughout the world. Unlike many European
countries, national identity in the United States is generally not tied in the
popular mind to a long history of excellence in the fine arts. The vitriol of
the culture wars suggests that some citizens would actually take greater
pride in a nation that does not support the arts at all. 213 The government
would most likely get a better return on its investment by funding sports,
industry, or Hollywood than the nonprofit arts.
3. Social integration
Some of the most recent arts policy research has focused on what might
be called the social benefits of the arts. Alvin Toffler sketched one version
of this justification in 1969: "The arts play an important role in integrating
individuals into subcultures within the larger society; they act on value
systems that accelerate or retard change and they educate individuals to
new role possibilities and style of life."2 4 Economists James Heilbrun and
Charles M. Gray captured the thrust of the argument, and its vagueness
thus far, in 1993: "It has sometimes been alleged that participation in the
arts makes us better human beings by exercising our sensibilities or by
exposing us to the highest and best achievements of our fellows."2 5 More
ambitious and particular inquiries into this potential benefit are quite
212. Peacock, Welfare Economics and Public Subsidies to the Arts, supra note 111, at 329-30.
213. COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 95.
214. Quoted in Cwi, Merit Good or Market Failure, supra note 100, at 80.
215. HEILBRUN, supra note 166, at 207.
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recent, and they have focused on the arts' ability to promote social
interaction, community identity, social capital, and organization for local
collective action.216 One recent study by the NEA indicates that
"[r]egardless of a person's education level, gender, or age, performing arts
attendance increases the likelihood of volunteering by 25 percentage
points. ,217 Although the study does not show a causal relationship (and
indeed any causation seems likely to be highly attenuated), the very
existence of the study and the boldness of its conclusion is telling.
218
In economic terms, justifications based on the social advantages of the
arts contend that their ability to strengthen social ties are externalities
benefiting society as a whole in addition to whatever utility or aesthetic
uplift direct consumers of the arts enjoy. Because the value of the social
effects are nonrival and nonexcludable, this argument goes, they are not
captured by the prices of arts experiences, so the government should
intervene to redress this market failure. Moreover, social benefits from the
arts are obviously linked not just to the amount of cultural activity but also
to the breadth of community participation in those activities. Unlike most
other economic arguments, even ones based on externalities, social benefit
arguments not only call for subsidies to encourage or preserve artistic
creation but also supply a powerful and paternalism-free reason to expand
involvement in the arts to new artists and audiences. Since the fine arts
tend to thrive in economically and socially privileged communities, these
arguments also appeal to concerns of equity in a sophisticated way.
Whereas a naive merit good argument demands better access to cultural
activities for less privileged groups based on the inherent value of art or its
character-building moral function, the social benefit argument demands
better access because of the demonstrable results to any community that
chooses to take advantage of that access.
This justification, particularly when cast in economic terms, appears
vulnerable to some of the concerns that have emerged consistently above.
First, if the argument for subsidy is to be based on the instrumental social
value of participation, proponents need to demonstrate that the arts are an
efficient way to achieve the cited benefits. If similar levels of social
capital, neighborhood spirit, and community involvement can be achieved
more cheaply through sports, parades, or Rotary clubs, this justification
would seem to collapse.2" 9 Just as opera, say, seems a less direct route to
national prestige than basketball, so, too, does it seem a dubious path to
216. MCCARTHY, supra note 95, at 14 (collecting recent studies).
217. BONNIE NICHOLS, NEA OFFICE OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR
THE ARTS, RESEARCH NOTE 94: VOLUNTEERING AND PERFORMING ARTS ATTENDANCE, at I sidebar
(2007).
218. See, e.g., GUETZKOW, supra note 140, at 17.
219. MCCARTHY, supra note 95, at 29
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cohesion. 220 Second, even if arts turn out to be the most efficient route to
social benefits (or to be a significant ingredient in the most efficient
recipe), arts advocates would have to show that indirect subsidy through
tax breaks would not supply enough of the right kind of cultural activity.
To do so, they would have to argue that the government or its agents
would be better at choosing the arts that will bind or develop a community
than private citizens in that community spending their own money-an
easy case if the community is very poor, but a difficult one where a large
portion of the population could afford at least modest donations. If a
community is able but unwilling to donate to the arts, even with
significant tax relief, advocates might have a hard time persuading the
government that residents would take advantage of arts events sponsored
by direct subsidy. Third, even if arts are efficient and direct government
funding is needed, the rhetoric of social benefits seems, like that of
economic impact, to be essentially local. Enhancing community
engagement is a proper goal for state and local governments, but it would
seem to be beyond both the mandate and the expertise of the federal
government. Finally, even if the social benefit argument convincingly
demanded direct federal subsidies, arts advocates might be wary of
advancing the claim, since the resulting funding would be disbursed based
not on artistic merit but on contribution to social capital.
All of these concerns suggest that the social argument for arts subsidies
is incomplete, if not highly problematic; however, they can all be
addressed by developing a variant of the argument. In fact, the next Part
argues that the civic externalities of the arts provide the strongest
justification for direct federal arts subsidy in the American context,
developing and defending this justification and considering how it should
guide NEA policy.
IV. AN AMERICAN VISION: THE CIVIC ARGUMENT FOR DIRECT FEDERAL
ARTS SUBSIDIES
The most powerful argument for direct federal arts subsidy is grounded
in the externality of civic education. In a democracy as plural as the
United States, citizens have a political duty to try to understand their
fellow Americans, and the national government has an obligation to foster
this understanding. This is most obvious and least controversial when the
government refrains from active suppression of moral or political
viewpoints so that robust civic debate is not impaired. Constitutionally-
imposed viewpoint-neutrality, which has served as the backdrop for many
of the NEA's legal battles, springs from the same principle: the
government must not skew public discussion by choosing sides with
220. Van den Haag, supra note 200, at 54-55.
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public resources. As a policy matter, the government should and does go
even further: it actively promotes education and civic understanding
through public schooling, indirect media subsidies, and campaign finance
reform.
Most of these activities are primarily concerned with enhancing
engagement with a diversity of explicitly political opinion. 22 Art that
either embodies political ideas directly or takes politics, political
discourse, or political history as its subject without advancing a partisan
agenda-a significant amount of art-fits neatly into these goals.
However, the civic benefits of the arts extend beyond "political" art to
encompass the lion's share of cultural activity. The civic justification for
subsidy begins with the unique ability of the arts to represent and
communicate the deeply-held beliefs, values, and characteristics that make
up the social, political, and moral worldview of groups and individuals.
A. The Expressive Power of the Arts
The expressive power of the arts has two important consequences for
civic life. First, by representing the subjectivity of the artist in a unique
way, art can encourage awareness of the sharp diversity of human
understanding. Art demonstrates that our own experiences of the world are
not exhaustive. As J.M. Coetzee has noted, "one of the great virtues of the
novel is to teach us that there is no perfect way of carving up the world or
recounting its stories. 2 2 This realization is vital to life in a truly pluralist
society, where a failure to appreciate the depth of diversity can only
impede social harmony and the smooth operation of democratic politics.
The arts, which appeal to both our aesthetic faculties and our reason, can
shock us into insight in a way that expository prose often cannot. In the
words of Martha Nussbaum, "[h]abits of wonder promoted by storytelling
define the other person as spacious and deep, with qualitative differences
from oneself and hidden places worthy of respect. ,223 The most powerful
experiences of empathy, with other Americans or people elsewhere in the
world, may well arise from aesthetic stimuli. A recent London School of
Economics working paper goes so far as to argue that fiction may be
superior to nonfiction reports or social scientific research as a way for
Western readers to understand, say, the realities of daily life in
Afghanistan under the Taliban.224
221. Cass Sunstein has argued vigorously for government encouragement of political speech,
including cultural activities that "promote education about civic affairs." Cass R. Sunstein, Television
and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 549 (2000). Although he also supports general arts
subsidies, he does so on the basis of "improv[ing] cultural life" rather than advancing democratic
deliberation. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 226-27 (1993).
222. Jonathan Roe, The Democracy of Don Quixote, PROSPECT, June 2007.
223. Quoted in MCCARTHY, supra note 95, at 40.
224. David Lewis, Dennis Rodgers & Michael Woolcock, The Fiction of Development:
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In addition to a general respect for the pluralism of experience,
expressive art communicates particular values in a singularly accessible
way. Art is a declaration of who the artist is, so that "communities find an
artist's work meaningful because they find elements of themselves and
what matters to them expressed there more eloquently than anywhere
else." '225 As an example, Michael Linton, an eloquent opponent of arts
subsidies, has noted that this expressive ability is not restricted to certain
kinds of communities or certain kinds of values: his own "highly dissonant
and rhythmically disjointed" modem music celebrates his Christianity,
whereas David Wojnarowicz's photography embodies the very different
values of a radical leftist, queer worldview.226 Linton uses this assertion to
argue that the members of one culture should not be dragooned into
supporting the expression of the values of another. But if provocative
cultural differences are inevitable in contemporary America, there is good
reason to ensure the availability of the tools to make sense of them. We
are already bound in discord; art is a way to ease the strain of pluralism by
rendering other cultures comprehensible.
The arts thus offer benefits that are indispensable to American
democracy-indeed, they are in a sense democracy in action. They invite
us to sympathize with people with whom we may bitterly disagree on
issues of great importance to us. By humanizing alternative worldviews,
they encourage self-reflection and the valuable democratic impulse to
think for oneself. And they advance the political and social dialogue
carried on through newspapers, books, and television through alternative,
sometimes more effective, means. Artistic experience can provide a
lifelong education in democratic citizenship,227 and it is for this reason that
the federal government should provide direct subsidies to the arts.
B. Defending the Civic Justification
The previous Part raised four general objections to the social benefit
argument for arts subsidy (indeed, to any instrumental argument): arts may
not be the most efficient way to achieve given benefits; indirect subsidies
may be superior; the argument may not apply to the federal government;
and the policy guidance offered by the argument may not match the
objectives of arts supporters who advance it. A civic justification offers
the strongest defenses against these attacks.
Knowledge, Authority, and Representation, Working Paper 05-61, London School of Economics and
Political Science (2005). See Stephen Adams, Novels 'Better at Explaining World's Problems than
Reports,' DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 6, 2008.
225. Michael Linton, The Blight of Cultural Rights, FIRST THINGS, June-July 2001, at 12, 13.
226. Id. at 12.
227. The reciprocal connection between arts and education has been widely studied; a full
consideration of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. The idea that cultural amenities
"supplement the school system, and do so for adults. . . is widely understood." Sunstein, Coherent and
Incoherent Valuation, supra note 180, at 7.
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This Note has evinced skepticism that government investment in the arts
could be the best way to amass national prestige, boost an economy, or
spur industrial and scientific innovation. Why then should the arts be the
most efficient way to educate citizens? The claim here is actually more
modest: that the arts play a unique and indispensable function in the civic
education of adult citizens. 228 This does not imply that the arts serve a
more important civic purpose than the media, public debate among
political candidates, or the preservation of historical sites like Monticello,
all of which benefit from direct or indirect subsidies. However, the civic
purposes of these various activities are ultimately incommensurable.
While political debate might offer a better forum for reasoned exchange of
views, art offers a chance for an exchange of values and subjectivities that
operates largely around reason. 229 Because our political views arise out of
these deeper characteristics, debate and art are complementary; by
supporting art, we advance the civic purpose of debate-but much more
important, we advance the civic purpose peculiar to art.
It is also worth noting that political deliberation favors and is often
restricted to an "articulate class, 23" but culture has the potential to
communicate with a much broader audience. Indeed, the arts help define
how we communicate by shaping our perception of reality and our
capacity to render it into words and images. "The common coin may be
provided by the forms of narrative that the culture offers US. 231 Because
other means of civic education serve different purposes, investment in the
arts represents the most efficient-perhaps the only-means of achieving
certain benefits.
So some level of artistic activity is vital to a pluralist democracy. But
does Congress need to tinker with the market to ensure it? From an
economic perspective, the market for art fails to account for civic
externalities, which means that the government may be justified in
redressing market failure. However, given the difficulty of quantifying
these benefits, how can we be sure the market level or distribution of
culture is inadequate? Why is government investment required at all?
One response to this objection would be grounded in fairness concerns.
Our obligation to understand our fellow citizens extends to those groups
that may not have the resources to create expressive art or the leisure to
228. The complicated question of the proper role of the arts in primary and secondary education,
where civic education is only one complex goal among many, is outside the scope of this Note.
229. The sublimation that values undergo before they are expressed in art may render them less
incendiary than bald expository assertions-although pictures like Andres Serrano's may speak louder
than words.
230. Richard Posner, Smooth Sailing, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, available at
http://wnvw.legalaffairs.org/issuesJanuary-February-2004/feature--psner--janfeb4.msp.
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experience it.232 If structural inequality means that such groups exist, the
government would be justified in alleviating those inequalities specifically
with respect to art, since art carries with it unique civic benefits.2 3
Identifying and characterizing such underprivileged groups would be a
contentious process, but ultimately a worthy one.
There is a better, broader argument for active government involvement.
Although it is difficult to prove that the market level of artistic expression
is flatly insufficient, significant government funding for the arts carries its
own civic benefits that reinforce those provided by art itself. First, subsidy
carries with it the message that the recipient of the funding is important; as
part of a broad-based grant program with the explicit goal of fostering
civic understanding, the seal of approval would be conferred not so much
on individual creators as on the project of artistic expression generally.
Properly publicized grants would attract the attention of private citizens,
both potential donors and potential communicants, as NEA awards have
since 1965. Second, by including unpopular or little-understood cultures
among the recipients, the government could address an enhanced variant
of the market failure mentioned above: in some cases, a low market
demand for expressions of a given culture would actually reflect a greater
need for those expressions to cure blithe or willful ignorance. Finally,
even-handed support for expressive art would emphasize the equality of
various worldviews-not with respect to their ultimate truth, which is
beyond the mandate of the government, but with respect to their
importance to individual citizens-and the consequent value of
understanding them. Government subsidy thus advances the civic function
of the arts in a way the market alone cannot.
But surely "even-handed support for expressive arts" would be better
served by indirect subsidy through tax breaks to donors or artists?
Establishing a value-neutral procedure for the broad promotion of cultural
expression through direct grants would be a logistical nightmare, and we
may well be skeptical of the government's ability to maintain it efficiently
and in good faith. Indirect subsidy has the advantage of not forcing the
government to select which artists or organizations to support, instead
allow it passively to support anyone who wishes to express herself through
culture.
This criticism raises important concerns about how civic subsidies could
work; unfortunately, indirect subsidies do not circumvent those concerns,
and they create difficulties of their own by entrenching the current
distribution of art among worldviews. Tax breaks for donors favor the
232. There may also be groups, and there will certainly be individuals, without the desire to create
expressive art. There are obvious arguments against forcing such people to paint.
233. Even Bruce Ackerman, who staunchly opposes subsidies to value-expressing art outside the
context of education, concedes that truly suppressed cultures would deserve state subsidy. Bruce
Ackerman, Should Opera Be Subsidized?, DISSENT, Summer 1999, at 89, 90.
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wealthy, which means they also favor the white and educated, and the
viewpoints associated with these characteristics. Tax breaks for the
producers of art are more promising, but there is bias in the population of
artists, too. Most obviously, fine artists, especially performing artists, tend
to live in and near urban centers. Tax breaks to institutions are equally
problematic, since administrators are driven by professional standards and
reputational concerns rather than civic virtue."' Of course, indirect
subsidies might induce members of underrepresented groups to begin
making art, and indirect subsidy would certainly be useful in promoting
artistic expression; however, the idea of a neutral distribution of
expressive art that would be disturbed by government interference is a
chimera.235 The general tendency of indirect subsidies to favor existing
cultural forms and ideas leaves them unable to secure the full civic
benefits of the arts.
If the government is going to have to choose which artistic speakers to
subsidize in order to supplement or correct the distribution of private
donations or to demonstrate the nation's commitment to cultural
understanding, shouldn't it be state or local governments who make those
choices? Local and state government should indeed subsidize the arts, and
should perhaps do the bulk of the choosing. However, the federal
government must also be involved, in part because the civic boost
considered above is much stronger when the official seal of approval on
expression comes, at least in part, from a national body. In addition,
although citizens should certainly strive to understand their fellow New
Haven residents, or their fellow Nutmeggers, the contemporary American
must also work to understand his farther-flung countrymen; this message
is driven home most effectively by federal subsidy for art, including art
that can travel between states or regions to reach less familiar audiences.
Tactical interests such as the promotion of expression by minorities and a
balancing of grants will also be advanced most effectively if all levels of
government participate in arts subsidies-the classic federalist argument
from checks and balances.
The final objection to the civic justification to be addressed here is
based on the policy guidance the argument offers. The next Section will
return to the question of guidance, but it is clear that the argument points
in a somewhat different direction from the naive merit good argument, or
the instinctive belief of many advocates of arts subsidies that cultural
experience is to be valued for its own sake and evaluated mostly in terms
of "artistic quality." Vladimir Nabokov, one of the last century's most
thoroughly aesthetic thinkers, would have dismissed the civic function of
art as unworthy. In his summation of a course in comparative literature, he
234. Cwi, "Merit Good or Market Failure," supra note 100, at 77.
235. See, e.g., COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 103.
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I have tried to make of you good readers who read books not for the
infantile purpose of identifying oneself with the characters, and not
for the adolescent purpose of learning to live, and not for the
academic purpose of indulging in generalizations. I have tried to
teach you to read books for the sake of their form, their visions, their
art. I have tried to teach you to feel a shiver of artistic satisfaction, to
share not the emotions of the people in the book but the emotions of
its author-the joys and difficulties of creation.
23 6
This Note is flirting with philistinism-and may indeed have been
entirely seduced by it-especially since it does not advance the civic
argument cynically to secure arts funding actually deserved on other
grounds. However, as much as a subsidy proponent might delight in art for
its own sake, and as much as she might hope others will choose-for
whatever reason-to support the art that appeals to her, the preceding
discussion has demonstrated that the government would not be justified in
enforcing her taste, or the taste of a large majority of voters, through
subsidy. The arts serve many purposes, and, pace Nabokov,
communication and expression are among the more important. These
purposes also happen to furnish the most legitimate basis for government
intervention in the art market-an intervention that avoids the paternalism
and elitism of evangelical fine art devotees and the dubious claims of
economic impact studies. If the policies this argument supports are, as
A.O. Scott has suggested, "emasculated" ones,237 it is important to note
that the robust funding system provided by individuals, businesses,
indirect subsidy, and earned income will still be available to art on the
basis of judgments of quality. Direct federal subsidies, though, should be
geared to a different goal.
C. A Pluralist Program ofArts Support
The civic argument offers several qualitative insights into what kinds of
projects should be funded.238 Unsurprisingly, the NEA's pattern of grants,
at least through the crisis of the 1990s, does not promote the civic function
of arts especially well. We have seen that the endowment was (and was
236. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LESSONS ON LITERATURE 381-82 (2002).
237. Quoted in Nanette Byrnes, The Man Who Saved the NEA, BUS.WK. ONLINE, Nov. 13, 2006.
238. With regard to the exact level of funding or specific schedule of disbursement, the civic
argument is less clear; to some extent, these numerical decisions must be left to the political process.
Obviously, the level of funding should be significant in order to signal the importance of the creation
and appreciation of expressive art; it also seems likely that, as mentioned in the last Section, some
federal subsidy money should be channeled through the states, which will be able to select recipients
with less elaborate bureaucratic prostheses. The 40% of NEA appropriations Congress requires to go
to the states probably satisfies the latter requirement, and the agency's 2006 budget of $125 million
may even qualify as "significant"-although advocates could make a strong political argument that
funding levels should at least be restored to their 1992 high of $176 million.
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intended to be) a political favor to established arts organizations; it
therefore favored the narrow, elitist range of expressive art deemed
worthiest by those organizations. The agency did not arise out of a
concern for the uncaptured political externalities of aesthetic experience;
"government support for the arts and culture today is not the result of
market failures, but of former policies. '239 To put it mildly, "in the course
of its justifiable concern with professionalism, institution-building and
experimentation during the 60s and 70s, the [NEA-funded] arts
community neglected those aspects of participation, democratization and
popularization that might have helped sustain the arts when the political
climate turned sour.,
240
NEA policy has developed since its narrow escape from defunding, and
some of the new trends are aligned with the civic purpose of art. However,
considerably more change is needed in several areas: the system of grants
encouraging artistic creation, projects designed to improve the
understanding of art, and national policy advocacy on behalf of the arts
community.241
1. Stimulating and Expanding Artistic Expression
The most radical change demanded by the civic justification is a new
emphasis on expressive art in both recipient selection criteria and in the
assessment of balance in grant distribution. The drafters of the NEA's
enabling legislation were careful to give the agency and its experts a free
hand in awarding grants based solely on artistic merit. This criterion,
though useful, is not enough to ensure the civic benefits of art; the process
of choosing award recipients must therefore take account of whether the
art in question contributes to civic dialogue-the extent to which it
expresses values, beliefs, or worldviews in order to correct the historical
failure of grants to "organize its participants in lasting ways, to link them
with local communities, or to help them voice an alternative to the
market's definition of 'quality.'
2 42
A great deal of political conversation will be necessary to determine
how we should evaluate art's expressiveness, but a few preliminary points
emerge from the foregoing discussion. First, art that expresses
contemporary values should be favored over less relevant art, no matter
how expressive. This means that some of the money the NEA spends on
239. Zimmer, supra note 19, at 35.
240. Fleming, supra note 4, at 64 (quoting GARY 0. LARSON, AMERICAN CANVAS (1997)).
241. The author argues elsewhere that the lynchpin of local governments' arts policy should be
promoting the informal or amateur arts on the grounds that these will bring the strongest and most
widespread civic (and possibly economic) benefits. An NEA initiative to support informal artsmakers
would be a similarly useful policy change.
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the preservation of artistic heritage should be shifted to grants that support
or disseminate more relevant artistic activity, although art need not be
contemporary in order to address present concerns. Second, some forms of
art may be more expressive than others: a novel or a play communicates
more obviously than a painting or a sonata simply because a large part of
its effect is achieved through language, our normal medium of exchange.
This is not to say that music and visual arts should not be subsidized; just
as arts generally offer an incommensurable alternative to expression
through political debate or expository prose, so the language of music can
communicate some things more effectively, or more effectively to some
listeners, than dialogue declaimed on a stage. It is important to fund not
only a variety of voices but also a variety of media, as well as educational
initiatives to render more esoteric languages comprehensible. However, a
legitimate bias toward art forms that communicate more clearly or
accessibly may naturally emerge. Third, setting aside differences in media,
individual artists and works will undoubtedly be more-or more
obviously-expressive of the views or values of the creator and her
culture. Such expression need not be heavy-handed to fit into this
category; indeed, overly didactic "art" might be better regarded as
expository than artistic. The civic benefits of art do not derive from its
ability to advance a logical argument, but rather from its ability to embody
a uniquely comprehensible version of the artist's subjectivity.
This suggests a major systemic problem: can the government or its
agents possibly be expected to evaluate a quality in art that cannot at
present even be defined with precision? As a preliminary matter, note that
expressiveness is no less elusive a concept than the current standard of
artistic merit, although the former has certainly been less thoroughly
debated. More important, precision is not required. We need not try to pay
the exorbitant information costs of quantifying the expressiveness of a
given artwork so that grants may be directed only to the most
communicative; given the varieties of means and subjects of expression,
the idea of a "most communicative" artwork is probably meaningless.
When the goal is to fund artistic excellence, deeming a proposal "good
enough" may be inadequate; when the goal is to promote the civic benefits
of art, a binary judgment that a given artwork is or is not expressive at
some, vaguely-defined threshold level in the community where it will be
experienced is perfectly sufficient. The NEA should not claim to be
identifying and elevating the most expressive artwork available; it should
only aim to advance the civic exchange by funding a variety of expressive
art.
One procedural step toward achieving this end would be to replace the
peer review panels with juries drawn from the American citizenry more
broadly. Juries in the criminal system have been shown to be surprisingly
scrupulous, even in cases where passions might be expected to run high.
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Prejudice and predispositions undoubtedly creep into deliberation, but in
the context of selecting recipients for modest arts subsidy, this is not a
fatal concern. Clear instructions as to the criteria of selection would help
counter the natural tendency to favor one's own values, and restricting the
amount of funding a given jury may disburse would help balance one set
of prejudices with another.243 The diverse selections of a range of juries
would stimulate broad discussion, defeating the objection that the
government is illegitimately endorsing a given viewpoint to the exclusion
of others. The decisions of peer review panels have always been political;
the use of citizen juries would embrace this inevitability and put it to good
use.
Although the NEA has not seriously considered abandoning its peer
review system, it has developed since the 1990s in ways that seem to
suggest openness to the civic argument. Dana Gioia, George W. Bush's
two-time appointee and the most recent NEA Chair, has denounced the
fact that the arts are "viewed as expendable, elitist luxuries rather than
necessary elements of a healthy democratic society." '244 Without
developing an explicit civic justification for subsidies, Gioia has
implemented at least one major national initiative that will stimulate and
expand artistic expression in accordance with the agency's appropriate
civic function. Operation Homecoming, a joint initiative with the military
services and the Department of Defense, sponsored writing workshops for
troops returning from Afghanistan and Iraq, eventually producing a
published anthology drawn from more than 1,200 submissions by soldiers
and their families.
245
Operation Homecoming was unusual for the NEA in two ways. First, it
was initiated by the agency itself rather than responding to a grant
proposal. Second, it focused on the military, an underrepresented group of
potential artists and an underrepresented audience.246 Both of these
innovations are to be encouraged. Proactive programs help avoid the mere
entrenchment of the present distribution of artistic activity and they further
emphasize the importance of artistic expression. Similarly, by identifying
and reaching out to groups that tend not to produce expressive art, the
government will broaden the range of expression and achieve both breadth
and balance in its funding.
243. See, e.g., Peacock, Welfare Economics and Public Subsidies to the Arts, supra note 11, at
333 ("The best means of protection seems to be a rapid circulation in the membership of the grant-
giving bodies so that all shades of cultural opinion can be reflected in the allocation of funds through
time.")
244. Quoted in Gioia: Lean NEA Is Best, BACKSTAGE, July 11, 2003.
245. STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2006-2011, supra note 58, at 5-6; 40T ANNIVERSARY FACTS, supra
note 2.
246. Bynres, supra note 237.
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2. Fostering Arts Appreciation and Discussion
The civic justification for the arts calls not only for reform of the
process for selecting artists to receive grants but also for the expansion of
the equally important category of funding to promote appreciation and
discussion of arts among adults. The purpose of this funding would be
twofold: to bring new audiences to arts and to ensure that the enjoyment of
art is regarded in part as a civic experience. The first purpose, expanding
audiences, has been an important goal for the NEA since Livingstone
Biddle first emphasized access. The best way to achieve this goal is
probably to ensure that students are exposed to a variety of art forms while
in school, although the extensive policy debates about arts education are
beyond the scope of this Article.
The second purpose, shaping the way the public engages with art, would
be more novel for the NEA. Just as the most ardent arts advocates do not
value the arts primarily or even significantly because of their civic value,
reflection on the values a work of art expresses-what we might call civic
appreciation of or engagement with--often makes up only a small portion
of an audience's aesthetic experience. This is entirely appropriate: the arts
offer many pleasures and many benefits, so excessive focus by the viewer
of a painting on its expression of a worldview would reflect an alarming
closed-mindedness. Nevertheless, because direct federal funding is
justified mostly on the narrow grounds of the civic function of arts, the
NEA should work to foster specifically civic appreciation of the works it
supports and of culture more generally. One means to this end would be
explicitly educational programs for adults on how artists express
themselves in various media, particularly less direct ones like music and
abstract painting. Another possibility would be community discussions of
the meaning of art sponsored and facilitated by the agency. The NEA
could also attach to its funding a requirement that the artist prepare a
statement about her art or be available to talk about his work when it is
first presented. By making art more accessible, programs like these may
also help broaden the audience for expressive art.
The 21st century NEA has to some extent already moved in this
direction. Dana Gioia has described the Endowment as a "public-service
agency" and views "supporting audiences" as a "more urgent priority than
supporting artists. ' 247 In keeping with this priority, he has implemented
two national initiatives that promise to advance the civic function of the
arts. The first, The Big Read, "provides resources and materials to
communities across the country to encourage citizens to read and discuss a
single" classic of American literature, such as To Kill A Mockingbird or
The Great Gatsby.248 The purpose of the program is not merely to
247. Bruce Weber, Poet Brokers Truce in Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 7, 2004, at El.
248. STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2006-2011, supra note 58, at 5-6.
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encourage literary reading at a time when it is in sharp decline but also to
use the chosen book to generate community discussion. At present, that
discussion is intended to be primarily aesthetic; the NEA should develop
questions and select books in order to focus the conversation on civic
appreciation in the broad sense this Section has been advocating. The
NEA should also be less timid in its choice of books. The selections to
date are entirely suitable for civic conversation, but Gioia has expressed a
general desire to promote art that is uncontroversial; his favorite NEA
programs involve sending jazz musicians and Shakespeare on tours
throughout the country.24 9 Gioia's caution is certainly justified for tactical
reasons, given the Endowment's tenuous claim to federal funds, and
plenty of civic benefit can be derived from uncontroversial art. However,
the agency should aspire to sponsor discussions of more provocative work
to whatever extent proves politically feasible, since art's expressive power
may be especially useful when it concerns controversial issues.
A second recent national initiative that furthers the NEA's civic role is
the establishment of Arts Journalism Institutes. Three annual sessions,
addressing dance, classical music and opera, and theater, are held at major
universities to educate journalists who cover these arts for media based
outside the largest markets.25 0 From the civic perspective, the idea of an
intense education for popular critics who can serve as intermediaries for
public engagement with art is brilliant. The NEA should implement
similar programs for arts administrators and community leaders and
incorporate training in the civic role the arts can play.
3. Advocating Policies to Support Expressive Art
As the Introduction made clear, just as the NEA is a small but important
component of overall arts funding in the United States, so the question of
subsidy is only one among many important policy questions that affect the
arts. Bill Ivey, who led the NEA under Bill Clinton, has suggested that
while the arts community has often focused on the question of funding, a
"quiet onslaught of business practices and regulations [has been]
reshaping our cultural system."25' It is therefore fitting to conclude with a
few reflections on how the civic justification for the arts might inform
these other debates.
One major concern among arts advocates is the concentration of
distribution networks and a resulting homogeneity of artistic offerings. For
example, "[t]oday the average radio station in a large market in the United
States programs music from a playlist of 20 to 22 selections. (On average
two tracks are substituted on the playlist each week.) Only five years ago
249. Weber, supra note 247.
250. STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2006-2011, supra note 58, at 5-6.
251. Ivey, supra note 123.
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[in 2000], stations routinely rotated 40 cuts, adding three or four each
week." Major mergers in the music industry and the growing market share
of the radio station giant Clear Channel are likely to exacerbate this
trend. 25 2 Although for-profit arts like popular music have traditionally not
been within the NEA's bailiwick, an agency reoriented toward its proper
civic function would advocate regulations to preserve diversity even in
lucrative artistic fields. Private corporations with responsibilities to
shareholders cannot be expected to ensure the expressive benefits of art, so
the government should take measures to prevent the market from
excluding them.
Copyright law is another sphere of heated debate in which the civic
perspective yields insights. The tension in this area is between the
dependence of new art on inspiration from existing art on the one hand,
which argues for the free use of artists' works by other artists, and the
need to enforce intellectual property rights to ensure that artists are
rewarded for their achievements so that they may continue creating on the
other.253 Because individual values and worldviews are shaped in part
through artistic experience, the expressive power of art is especially
dependent on the availability and free use of arts by artists. The civic
benefits of art thus provide an additional argument for a copyright system
that promotes the use and dissemination of artistic creation, perhaps
through a compulsory licensing scheme that would force the holder of a
government-granted copyright monopoly to share some of his monopoly
position for civic purposes.254  As this brief sketch indicates,
acknowledging the force of the civic justification for arts subsidy will
have consequences beyond the question of NEA grants. The NEA should
therefore undertake research and policy advocacy to ensure that the legal
underpinnings of the art market promote civic engagement with the arts.
CONCLUSION
The skeptics of arts subsidies who rose to political prominence under
Presidents Reagan and Bush were wrong. There is at least one sound
economic and political justification for direct federal arts subsidies: the
argument based on the vital role the arts can play in civic education.
Indeed, in a pluralist democratic state, the government has an obligation to
encourage citizens to reap the civic benefits of the arts. This uniquely
valid argument for direct subsidies requires considerable changes in the
once-elitist NEA; recent developments are promising in this regard, but
252. Ivey, supra note 123.
253. The debate also encompasses the right of the audience to the fruits of thought and creativity,
which after all arise out of the social experience of the artist; this argument is too broad to be
considered here.
254. See, e.g., COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY, supra note 3, at 130.
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the agency must go much farther. A good first step would be the explicit
recognition of the Endowment's proper civic function.
Implementing the civic role of the arts will not be easy. The concept
itself will require much fleshing out through democratic discussion. Even
as a working definition is developed, opposition is likely to arise from
some members of the arts community, who would like to see direct grants
used for a purely aesthetic purpose, and from socially conservative
politicians, who may exploit the controversial nature of any art properly
funded on the grounds of civic expression. But simply having these
conversations, and moving toward the civic ideal in small ways, will put
direct federal arts subsidies on firmer ground. It will also make better
Americans out of all of us.
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